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REVISITING THE LYONS DEN: Summers v.
Earth Island Institute's Misuse of Lyons's
"Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test'
Bradford Mankt
In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009), the majority
and dissenting opinions disagreed about how to apply the "realistic threat"
test set forth in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983).
According to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Summers, the plaintiff
organizations did not have standing to obtain injunctive relief because they
failed to prove that their members were likely in the near future to hike on
government land on which the Forest Service conducted allegedly illegal
sales of timber without public notice and comment and that the facts alleged
by the plaintiffs were weaker than the "conjecture" rejected as insufficient
for standing in Lyons. By contrast, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in
Summers argued that there was a "realistic threat" of future harm to the
plaintiffs under the Lyons test. This Article re-examines Lyons. The Article
also discusses Supreme Court and lower court decisions that have applied
the Lyons test or distinguished that case. The Article concludes that there
was a realistic threat of harm justifying injunctive relief in Summers if
Lyons and its progeny are correctly understood.
I This Article is one of a series of explorations of possible extensions of modem
standing doctrines. The other pieces are (1) Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; (2) Standing and Future Generations:
Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for the Unborn?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Mank, Future Generations]; (3) Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based
Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons]. In Parts I, IV, and V, this Article builds on a previous article discussing
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009), Summers v. Earth Island Institute
Rejects Probabilistic Standing, But a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40
ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2010), http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cftn?abstractid=1497647
[hererinafter Mank, Previous Article on Summers]. This Article goes beyond my previous
Summers article by focusing on the role of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108
(1983) in the decision. Parts II, III, and VI are completely new.
t James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O.
Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, 45221-0040, Tel: 513-556-0094; Fax
513-556-1236; e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine and Darrell Miller for
their comments. All errors or omissions are my responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
To file suit in federal courts, Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires
that a plaintiff must demonstrate "standing" by establishing that the
defendant's actions have caused him an actual or imminent injury, and not
merely a speculative or hypothetical injury that might occur someday.1 In
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Summers v. Earth Island
Institute,2 Justice Antonin Scalia rejected the concept of organizational
standing based upon the statistical probability that some of an
organization's members will likely be harmed in the near future by a
defendant's allegedly illegal actions.3 He argued that the probability that
members of several environmental groups would be harmed in the future by
the United States Forest Service's allegedly illegal salvage sales of fire-
damaged timber "present[ed] a weaker likelihood of concrete harm than that
which we found insufficient in [City of Los Angeles v.] Lyons.",4 In Lyons, a
plaintiff who "alleged that he had been injured by an improper" chokehold
by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department "sought injunctive relief
barring [the] use of the [choke]hold in the future." 5 The Lyons Court
concluded that Lyons did not have standing to seek injunctive relief because
there was "no more than conjecture" that Lyons would be subjected to that
chokehold if he were ever to be stopped or arrested in the future by the Los
Angeles police.6 Similarly, the Summers Court held that the plaintiff
organizations failed to prove their members were likely to suffer an
"imminent" injury required for standing because they could not prove
where and when their specific members would be harmed in the future by
the government's allegedly illegal timber sales.'
On the other hand, Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting opinion in
Summers argued that the plaintiff organizations had satisfied Lyons's
"realistic threat" test for determining when an injury is sufficient for
standing.8 He contended there was a realistic probability that one of the tens
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see infra Part I
(discussing Article III standing requirements).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
3. Id. at 1150-53. Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas and Alito. Id. at 1146. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1150 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)).
5. Id.
6. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983).
7. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150-53.
8. Id. at 1155-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 106 n.7, 108 (1983) (emphasis added by Justice Breyer)).
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of thousands of members of the plaintiff organizations would have his or
her recreational experience diminished in the near future by the Forest
Service's frequent sales of fire-damaged timber in national forests.9
Accordingly, Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion in Summers reached quite different conclusions about
how to apply Lyons's realistic threat test to the quite different facts of an
environmental standing case.10
One other major environmental standing case also involved a
disagreement between the majority opinion and dissenting opinion about the
application of Lyons's realistic threat standing test. In Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.," the Supreme Court
applied Lyons's realistic threat standing test to an environmental claim.'2
Even though the plaintiffs could not prove that the defendant's mercury
discharges caused harm to the environment or human health, the Laidlaw
Court concluded that the plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrating that they had
avoided recreational use of a river because of their "reasonable concerns"
about the mercury's impact on their health was sufficient for standing under
Lyons. 3 In his dissenting opinion in Laidlaw, however, Justice Scalia
argued that the plaintiffs' subjective concerns about the safety of recreating
in a river subject to the defendant's mercury releases failed to establish a
realistic threat as defined in Lyons. 4
Because the application of the Lyons standing test has become quite
important in environmental cases, this Article re-examines Lyons's
framework and then applies it to the different factual circumstances in
environmental cases. The Lyons Court rejected standing for injunctive relief
where a plaintiff can allege only one prior violation of his rights by the
government and cannot provide any credible evidence that he is likely to be
subject to future violations.' 5 Subsequent cases have distinguished Lyons in
cases in which there have been multiple past violations by the government
and there is a more realistic threat of future violations.' 6 Additionally, the
Lyons Court emphasized that its denial of standing was based in part on the
fact that the Los Angeles Police Department had adopted a policy
prohibiting police from using a chokehold against defendants like Lyons
9. Id. at 1156-58.
10. Id. at 1152-53 (majority opinion), 1156-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
12. Id. at 184-85; see infra Part IV.A.
13. See 528 U.S. at 183-85; see infra Part V.A.
14. 528 U.S. at 198-200 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Parts II, VI.A.
16. See infra Parts II, VI.A.
83942:0837]
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
unless there was adequate provocation. 7  Subsequent cases have
distinguished Lyons in holding that standing for injunctive relief is
appropriate if the government has a policy that is likely to lead its agents to
commit rights violations against the plaintiff. 8
Several Supreme Court and lower court decisions have distinguished
Lyons in holding that a plaintiff had standing to seek prospective relief. For
example, in Kolender v. Lawson, which was decided a few days after Lyons,
the Supreme Court held that a vagrant who had been arrested or detained
fifteen times by California police officers pursuant to a California statute
had standing to seek prospective relief because he had demonstrated a
"credible threat" that California would arrest him in the future in violation
of his constitutional rights.' 9 In Honig v. Doe, the Supreme Court
distinguished Lyons where the plaintiff demonstrated that government
violations of his statutory rights were likely because his emotional disability
led him to engage in behavior that was likely to provoke school officials to
violate his statutory rights.2" Furthermore, there are a number of lower court
criminal, civil rights, and disability decisions which have either followed
Kolender or Honig instead of Lyons, or found that standing was appropriate
under the Lyons framework because the plaintiff had successfully
demonstrated a likelihood of future government violations.2 These
criminal, civil rights, and disability decisions are typically not cited in
environmental cases, but can and should provide guidance in how Lyons's
realistic threat test should be applied in environmental cases.2" Despite
scholarly criticism, the Supreme Court has generally treated standing as an
overarching trans-substantive jurisdiction question separate from
substantive law, and, therefore, it is appropriate for courts to consider
standing cases involving different substantive law.23
17. See infra Parts II, VI.B.
18. See infra Parts II, VI.B.
19. 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983) (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434 (1975)); see
infra Part III.A.
20. 484 U.S. 305, 321-23 (1988); see infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C-G.
22. See infra Part III.
23. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia concluded that it was irrelevant for
Article III standing whether the underlying substantive issue was a constitutional or statutory
question. 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). He stated: "But there is absolutely no basis for making the
Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right." Id. Scholars have unsuccessfully
criticized the Court's view that Article III standing is trans-substantive.
A number of scholars have persuasively argued that the Supreme Court's
efforts to treat standing as a transsubstantive jurisdictional issue are
misguided. They explain that the question of standing is best treated as a
question indistinguishable from whether the party has a right of action.
[Ariz. St. L.J.840
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By re-examining Lyons, Kolender, Honig, and lower court decisions
applying those decisions, it is possible to come to a better understanding of
how the Supreme Court should have applied the Lyons realistic threat test in
Summers.24 The likelihood that the members of the environmental
organizations would be harmed by the Forest Service's timber sales in
Summers was far greater than the possibility that Los Angeles police
officers would again subject Lyons to a chokehold, despite Justice Scalia's
unsupported assertion to the contrary.25 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
in Summers provided a more accurate application of Lyons's realistic threat
test than the majority opinion. His dissenting opinion would have been
stronger, however, if he had also discussed Kolender, Honig, and several
important lower court decisions.26 In light of Lyons and its progeny, the
Court should have found standing in Summers.
Part I summarizes standing doctrine. Part II examines Lyons's standing
framework. Part III explores Kolender, Honig, and several lower court
decisions that address Lyons. Part IV examines Laidlaw and its discussion
of Lyons. Part V explicates Summers's use of Lyons. Part VI re-examines




Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a plaintiff have
standing to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the Supreme Court has
inferred from the Constitution's Article III limitation of judicial decisions to
"cases" and "controversies" that federal courts must utilize standing
requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake
in a case. 28 All litigants in federal Article III courts must meet certain
Phrased this way, the issue is one of substantive and remedial law, not one of
Article III jurisdiction.
Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that
Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2239,
2251-52 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
Despite his skepticism, Professor Hartnett acknowledges that the Supreme Court treats
standing as a trans-substantive jurisdictional question. Id. at 2251-55.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. Part I's discussion of standing builds upon my previous article on Summers. See Mank,
Previous Article on Summers, supra note T, at 7-13.
28. The Constitution provides:
42:0837]
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standing requirements to bring a suit.2 9 The federal courts have jurisdiction
over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove that he or she has standing
for each form of relief sought, such as damages or injunctive relief.3 ° As
will be discussed in Part II, the Lyons decision treated standing for
prospective relief as a separate issue from standing for damages.3" Standing
doctrine resolves whether a party to a law suit is a proper party to sue and
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and
Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the
Article III standing requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time); DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339-43 (2006) (explaining Article III's case and controversy
requirement necessitates standing limitations); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992))
("Article III standing ... enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement."); Mank,
States Standing, supra note 1:, at 1709-10. But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH L. REV. 163, 168-79, 217 (1992)
(arguing framers of the Constitution did not intend that Article III would require standing).
29. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1:, at 1709-10; Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating
Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 533 (2004). States asserting sovereign
or quasi-sovereign rights may be entitled to more lenient standing requirements in some cases,
but generally must comply with the basic standing requirements discussed in Part I of this
Article. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007) (holding states asserting quasi-
sovereign rights are entitled to more lenient standing test under the parens patriae standing
doctrine); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1:, at 1727-34, 1746-56, 1775-80, 1785-87 (2008)
(arguing Massachusetts liberalized standing requirements for states using parens patriae
doctrine but did not eliminate all standing requirements for states).
30. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-54; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 4:, at 1710.
Standing is one factor in determining whether a suit is legitimately justiciable in court. Jeremy
Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class
Actions, 77 TEX. L. REv. 215, 219 (1998) ("Other aspects of justiciability include the doctrines
of ripeness, mootness, advisory opinions, and political questions.").
31. See Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040, 1041 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1999)
(overruling Ninth Circuit decisions that had recognized standing for prospective relief if
plaintiff had standing for damages as contrary to Lyons); Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d
959, 966-67 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding Lyons requires separate standing analysis for damages and
injunctive relief); Laura E. Little, It's About Time: Unraveling Standing and Equitable
Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 933, 937, 941, 944 (1993) (agreeing with majority of lower courts
that Lyons requires separate standing analysis for each type of remedy requested); infra Part II.
842 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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does not decide whether the asserted claim is appropriate.3 2 "A federal court
must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet
the constitutional standing test."
33
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional principles.
For example, standing doctrine prohibits federal courts from giving
advisory opinions about proposed legislation and, as a result, prevents
judicial entanglements with the political controversies of the legislative and
executive branches.34  More broadly, standing requirements support
separation of powers principles defining the division of powers between the
judiciary and political branches of government so that the "Federal
Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society."'
35
Many cases have outlined standing criteria. Most notably, in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court required the plaintiff to show that:
(1) she has "suffered an injury in fact," which is "concrete and
particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical";
(2) "there [is] a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury [is] fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court"; and (3) "it [is] likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision., 36 A
party must assert a personal injury and generally may not assert the rights of
a third party unless the party is a legally appointed guardian for that third
party.37 "A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs of the
standing test."'38
32. Mank, States Standing, supra note $, at 1710.
33. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-43 (2006); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of
the litigation."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710.
34. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41; FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998);
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 4, at 679; Johnathan R. Nash, Standing and
the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 494, 506 (2008).
35. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-41 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984)); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 679; Nash, supra note 34, at
506; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881, 894-97 (1983).
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (alteration in original)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global
Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 23-24 (2005) [hereinafter Mank,
Global Warming].
37. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-34 (2004) (observing general rule that party
does not have standing to represent the interests of third parties but recognizing narrow
exception if party has "close" relationship with third party and "hindrance" prevents third party
42:0837]
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In Warth v. Seldin,39 the Court first explicitly recognized that "an
association may have standing solely as the representative of its members,"
despite "the absence of injury to itself."4 The Court warned, however, that
"the possibility of such representational standing ... does not eliminate or
attenuate the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy."4 The
court stated that "the association must allege" that at least one of its
members is "suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit."4
B. Imminent Injury
The Court has suggested that a plaintiff may obtain standing for a
threatened risk. Prior to its Lujan decision, in Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers National Union, the Court stated, "[o]ne does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury
is certainly impending, that is enough., 43 The Lujan court's recognition of
standing for an "imminent" injury appears to be similar to Babbitt's
approach to "impending" injuries. 44 "The imminent injury test, however
does not clearly explain how probable a risk to a plaintiff must be" or how
from asserting his own interest); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding party must
assert personal interest for standing and usually cannot have standing on behalf of third parties).
38. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction
must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III"); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
(stating also that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must carry the burden of establishing
standing under Article III); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note t, at 673.
39. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
40. Id. at 511; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 677; Christopher J.
Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication,
91 VA. L. REv. 1463, 1493 (2005).
41. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)); Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note T, at 677; Roche, supra note 40, at 1493.
42. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 677-
78; Roche, supra note 40, at 1493.
43. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather
than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing requirements."); Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 4, at 684.
44. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Babbit, 442 U.S. at 298; see
also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting "imminent" standing test to include an increased risk of harm).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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soon it must occur for the litigant to have standing.45 For example, the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted the "imminent" standing test to include an increased
risk of harm, 46 but that approach is arguably contrary to Justice Scalia's
subsequent Summers decision.47
II. LYONS
In Summers, Justice Scalia interpreted Lyons to hold that a plaintiff who
has been injured by the government in the past does not have standing to
obtain an injunction to prohibit future injury where there is only conjecture
that the government might harm him in the future.48 While his interpretation
is true in some circumstances, the Lyons decision also recognized that a
plaintiff would have standing to obtain an injunction if there is a "realistic
threat" that the government will harm him in the future. 49 Furthermore, a
plaintiff can establish such a realistic threat by showing, for example, that
the government has a policy ordering government officials to act in a
manner likely to harm individuals similar to him.5"
A. Lyons's Facts
In 1976, a plaintiff, Adolph Lyons, filed a complaint in federal district
court stating that City of Los Angeles ("City") police officers had stopped
him for the traffic violation of driving with a faulty taillight.51 Although he
alleged that he had offered no resistance or provocation, the officers without
justification "applied a 'chokehold'---either the 'bar arm control' hold or
the 'carotid-artery control' hold or both"-that rendered Lyons unconscious
and seriously injured his larynx.52 Four months after the incident, 53 Lyons
filed suit in federal district court against the Los Angeles Police Department
("Department") and four of its police officers for damages, declaratory
45. Mank, Future Generations, supra note $, at 39; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 684.
46. Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1151 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)) (interpreting "imminent" standing
test to include an increased risk of harm).
47. See infra Part V.A.
48. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-50 (2009).
49. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-07 & n.7 (1983).
50. Id. at 106-07.
51. Id. at 97, 114.
52. Id. at 97-98.
53. Id. at 97 (explaining the police choked the plaintiff on October 6, 1976 and the
plaintiff filed suit on February 7, 1977).
42:0837] 845
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relief and an injunction to prohibit the Department from using chokeholds
except where a suspect presented an immediate threat of deadly force to an
officer." In support of the claim for injunctive relief, the complaint alleged
that, pursuant to the city's authorization, the City's police officers
"regularly and routinely" applied the chokeholds in "situations where they
[were] not threatened by the use of any deadly force."5 5 Furthermore, the
complaint alleged that the plaintiff "and others similarly situated [were]
threatened with irreparable injury in the form of bodily injury and loss of
life," and, therefore that the plaintiff reasonably feared that any contact with
the City police might result in him being choked or strangled to death
without cause. 56 The district court granted a preliminary injunction against
the Department's use of the chokehold where no one is threatened with
deadly force. 7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision "in a brief per curiam opinion stating that the
District Court had not abused its discretion in entering a preliminary
injunction. ' 58
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, "the Chief of Police in Los
Angeles prohibited the use of the bar-arm chokehold in any circumstances,"
and the Los Angeles "Board of Police Commissioners imposed a 6-month
moratorium on the use of the carotid-artery chokehold except under
circumstances where deadly force is authorized., 59 Because the moratorium
raised questions about whether the case was moot, the City filed a
memorandum suggesting a question of mootness, reciting the facts but
arguing that the case was not moot. 60 The plaintiff in response filed a
motion arguing that the Court had improvidently granted certiorari;
however, the Court denied that motion but reserved the question of
mootness for later consideration.6' When it decided the case, the Court
concluded that the case was not moot because the City's moratorium was
not permanent, but instead held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
54. Id. at 97-98.
55. Id. at 98. "Originally, Lyons' complaint alleged that at least two deaths had occurred
as a result of the application of chokeholds by the police. His first amended complaint alleged
that 10 chokehold-related deaths had occurred. By May, 1982, there had been five more such
deaths." Id. at 100.
56. Id. at 98. "Originally, Lyons' complaint alleged that at least two deaths had occurred
as a result of the application of chokeholds by the police. His first amended complaint alleged
that 10 chokehold-related deaths had occurred. By May, 1982, there had been five more such
deaths." Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 99-100.
58. Id. at 100.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 101.
61. Id. (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).
[Ariz. St. L.J.846
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consider Lyons's claim for injunctive relief because he did not have
standing. 62
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision granting a
preliminary injunction because it concluded that Lyons could not establish
that he was likely to be injured in the future and, thus, lacked standing to
seek an injunction.6 3 The Court observed that its precedent had established
that a plaintiffs allegations that a defendant has engaged in illegal or
harmful conduct in the past is insufficient to justify injunctive relief without
a "real and immediate threat of repeated injury,"64 which might be satisfied
by demonstrating that the defendant has a "deliberate policy" of engaging in
wrongful conduct.65 While the Court implied that Lyons's allegations of
harm from the Los Angeles police officers were presumptively sufficient
for standing to seek damages against the individual officers and perhaps the
City, the Supreme Court in Lyons concluded that the plaintiff's allegations
were insufficient for prospective injunctive relief because he could not
prove that he was likely to suffer harm from the Los Angeles police in the
future.66 Even if a court accepted as true Lyons's additional allegation that
the Los Angeles police routinely applied chokeholds in circumstances
where the police were not "threatened by the use of deadly force," the Lyons
Court reasoned that it was too speculative to assume that Lyons would, first,
be stopped or arrested by the police and, second, that the arresting officers
would apply a chokehold without provocation. 67 The Court determined that
Lyons's allegations were insufficient to establish that the Los Angeles
police would likely harm him now or in the future with an inappropriate
chokehold.68 Furthermore, to the extent Lyons sought injunctive relief
against the City and the Department to protect other citizens, the Court
concluded that Lyons had the burden of showing either that all Los Angeles
police officers consistently applied illegal chokeholds without provocation
to all citizens they interact with, which is an impossible burden for a
plaintiff like Lyons to meet, or that a City policy encouraged or required
62. Id.
63. Id. at 105-10, 113.
64. Id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)).
65. Id. at 104 (discussing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976)).
66. Id. at 105; Little, supra note 31, at 941, 944 (explaining that Lyons denied Lyons's
request for prospective injunctive relief, but suggested that he might recover damages).




police officers to use illegal chokeholds in situations where their use was
not necessary.69 The Court stated:
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons
would have had not only to allege that he would have another
encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion
either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any
citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for
the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or (2)
that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such
manner. 
70
Even if the Court accepted as true the allegations in his Complaint that Los
Angeles police occasionally exceeded the scope of the City's chokehold
policy by using a chokehold without adequate provocation, Lyons's
allegations were insufficient to justify an injunction against the City and the
Department.71
Although Lyons's complaint had alleged that the City authorized its
police to use control chokeholds in circumstances where a citizen had not
threatened deadly force against the officer, the Court concluded that Lyons
had failed to demonstrate that he would "be realistically threatened by
police officers who acted within the strictures of the City's policy. ' 72 For
example, if the City only authorized police to use chokeholds against
suspects that resisted arrest or tried to escape, the Court reasoned that it was
unlikely that the police would again use a chokehold against Lyons without
provocation, and, therefore, no realistic threat existed that necessitated
injunctive relief in his favor.73 Because Lyons failed to credibly allege that
the police were likely to harm him and other citizens without provocation in
the future, he lacked a personal injury sufficient to establish standing for an
injunction barring the police from using chokeholds in the future.74
In his dissenting opinion in Lyons, Justice Marshall criticized the
majority for requiring separate standing for damages and for injunctive
relief for a plaintiff who has suffered a personal injury that gives him or her
a real stake in filing suit against the defendant.7' Furthermore, he argued:
The Court's fragmentation of the standing inquiry is also
inconsistent with the way the federal courts have treated remedial
69. Id. at 105-06.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 106-10.
74. Id. at 106 n.7.
75. Id. at 113-14, 122-3 1(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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issues since the merger of law and equity. The federal practice has
been to reserve consideration of the appropriate relief until after a
determination of the merits, not to foreclose certain forms of relief
by a ruling on the pleadings.76
A number of commentators have criticized Lyons's separate standing
analysis for damages and prospective injunctive relief because an action for
the recovery of damages is often insufficient to prevent the government
from committing civil rights abuses.77 While often criticized by academics
for unduly restricting the availability of injunctive relief in civil rights
cases, Lyons's requirement of separate standing for each form of relief
remains the law.78
It is important to distinguish the situation in Lyons from other possible
factual scenarios a court might address in deciding whether a plaintiff has
standing to seek injunctive relief. First, Lyons was the victim of one
instance of a wrongful conduct. 79 Lyons does not address a situation where a
plaintiff has been repeatedly subjected to wrongful conduct by a
defendant.8 As will be discussed in Part VI.A, in at least some cases where
there has been repeated wrongful conduct by a defendant, it may be
reasonable for a court to assume that the defendant is likely to repeat the
conduct absent some change in circumstances affecting either the plaintiff
or the defendant.81 Second, the Lyons Court acknowledged that the case
would be different if the City, for example, had a policy of using the
chokehold in every routine traffic stop, and subsequent cases have found a
realistic threat of harm where a government agency has a policy of engaging
in wrongful conduct.82 As will be discussed below in Part VI, in Summers
there was far greater likelihood of future government violations than in
Lyons because members of the plaintiff environmental groups in Summers
frequently visited national forests, in contrast to Lyons's single encounter
with the police.83 Furthermore, the government in Summers had a clear
policy of conducting salvage sales of fire-damaged timber without the
allegedly required public notice and comment.8 4 Accordingly, there was a
76. Id. at 130.
77. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Story of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Closing the Federal
Courthouse Doors, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 131, 131-32, 145 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L.
Goluboff eds., 2008); Little, supra note 31 passim.
78. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 147-49; Little, supra note 31 passim.
79. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105, 111.
80. See infra Part VI.A.
81. See infra Part VI.A.
82. 461 U.S. at 105-06; see infra Part VI.B.
83. See infra Part V1.
84. See infra Part VI.
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far greater likelihood of future government violations in Summers than in
Lyons. 
8 5
III. CASES FINDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE TO ADDRESS
REPEATED VIOLATIONS OR A POLICY CONDONING WRONGFUL CONDUCT
In several cases, the Supreme Court or lower courts have distinguished
Lyons where a plaintiff provided credible allegations that a government
defendant would likely harm him in the future.86 First, some of these cases
involved repeated past violations that seemed likely to recur in the future.87
Second, some decisions have distinguished Lyons on the ground that the
plaintiffs in their cases were involved in legally protected conduct that was
more likely to be repeated in the future than the probability that Adolph
Lyons would again commit an illegal motor vehicle violation that in turn
would result in an unprovoked chokehold by the police.8" Third, courts are
especially likely to find a realistic threat of future harm if the government
has adopted an official policy or practice that condoned or enhanced the
likelihood of future violations. 89 Fourth, some courts found a credible or
realistic threat of harm in part because the government targeted a minority
or a disadvantaged group.90 By contrast, the Supreme Court in Lyons did not
find that the Los Angeles Police Department had targeted minorities despite
evidence that African-American men were twenty times more likely to be
85. See infra Part VI.
86. Two commentators have briefly discussed how subsequent decisions limited Lyons's
strict approach to equitable relief by finding that plaintiffs had demonstrated a "credible" or
"realistic" threat of future harm and granting equitable relief, but neither addressed this
important issue in depth. See David Rudovsky, Lecture, Running in Place: The Paradox of
Expanding Rights and Restricting Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 1199, 1236-37 & nn.233-35
(2005); Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-26 (2000).
87. See infra Parts III.H, VIA; see generally Garrett, supra note 86, at 1820-26 & n.43
(quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 n.7) (arguing post-Lyons cases use a flexible, individualized
fact-specific inquiry in determining whether there is a "'credible threat' of future harm,"
including frequency of government misconduct).
88. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 & n.234 (stating plaintiffs are more likely to
demonstrate credible threat of future government harm if the plaintiff is engaging in "protected
activity"); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1825-26 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more likely to find a
credible threat of future harm if the plaintiff is engaging in law-abiding behavior than illegal
behavior); infra Parts III.H, VI.A.
89. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 & n.233 (stating plaintiff can demonstrate a
credible or realistic threat of harm by demonstrating "that the harm was the product of a policy
or practice of' government); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1821-25 (arguing post-Lyons cases are
more likely to find a credible threat of future harm if there is an official policy condoning that
misconduct); infra Parts III.H, VI.B.
90. See Garrett, supra note 86, at 1826-29; infra Parts IIl.H, VI.C.
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subjected to a chokehold than white men.91 Fifth, some courts have applied
a more liberal approach to equitable remedies than Lyons in cases involving
fundamental First Amendment speech rights.92
A. Kolender v. Lawson
Just twelve days after Lyons,93 the Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson
concluded that a plaintiff who had been arrested or detained fifteen times in
the past had demonstrated a "'credible threat"' that California would arrest
him in the future in alleged violation of his constitutional rights. 94 The
plaintiff, Edward Lawson, was either detained or arrested fifteen times for
violating a California statute requiring "persons who loiter or wander [] the
streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to identify
themselves when stopped by a police officer." 95 He filed suit in a federal
district court challenging the statute as unconstitutional, sought a mandatory
injunction against enforcement of the statute, and also sought pecuniary and
punitive damages from the detaining officers.96 The district court found that
the statute was overbroad and enjoined its enforcement. 97 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional
for reasons articulated by the lower court.98 Additionally, the appellate court
determined that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
"against unreasonable searches and seizures," contained an impermissibly
"vague enforcement standard," and failed to provide "fair and adequate
notice" of the proscribed conduct. 99 Affirming the lower court decisions, the
Supreme Court held that the statute was "unconstitutionally vague on its
face" because it encouraged arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify its
"requirement that a suspect provide a 'credible and reliable'
identification." 00
91. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 115-16 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 30, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (No. 81-1064),
1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1457; Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 137 (citing Brief for
Respondent at 30, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (No. 81-1064)).
92. See infra Parts II.H, VI.D.
93. Lyons was decided on April 20, 1983. 461 U.S. at 95. Kolender was decided on May
2, 1983. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 352 (1983).
94. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355 n.3. "Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted
once." Id. at 354.
95. Id. at 353-54 (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970)).
96. Id. at 354.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 355.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 352.
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Although observing that the defendant California officials did not
challenge the declaratory and injunctive relief in the case nor Lawson's
standing, the Supreme Court in a footnote suggested that standing for
declaratory and injunctive relief was appropriate in the Kolender case. 1 '
Because Lawson had been stopped on "approximately 15 occasions
pursuant to § 647(e) . . . in a period of less than two years," the Court
concluded there was a "'credible threat' that Lawson might be detained
again under § 647(e)."1 °2 While it did not cite or discuss Lyons, the
Kolender Court found a realistic threat of future wrongful conduct by the
government against Lawson that it was unwilling to find against Lyons
twelve days earlier. 103
Common sense suggests that it is far more likely that a vagrant who has
been detained or arrested fifteen times in less than two years will be
detained in the future by police and asked for identification than a person
driving a car who commits a minor code violation will be stopped by the
police and then be harmed without provocation by the unnecessary use of a
chokehold. California Penal Code section 647(e) required loiterers to carry
identification and also declared that police officers had the right to ask for
identification from loiterers. 10 4 Assuming Lawson was a loiterer, it is not
surprising that California police frequently followed statutory policy by
detaining or arresting Lawson and demanding that he produce
identification. 105 By contrast, the police who applied a chokehold to Lyons
without provocation clearly would have violated the Los Angeles Police
Department's policy on the use of the chokeholds adopted while Lyons's
case was pending before the Supreme Court. 0 6 Accordingly, reading Lyons
and Kolender together, the Court suggested that a plaintiff cannot rely on a
single act of official misconduct in violation of policy to justify an
injunctive relief against future harmful conduct. However, the plaintiff is
entitled to relief if the government officials repeatedly harmed the defendant
pursuant to a statute or policy requiring officials to engage in the alleged
wrongful conduct.
101. Id. at 355 n.3.
102. Id. (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434 (1975)).
103. Compare Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355 n.3, with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 105-10,113 (1983).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2004).
105. Id.
106. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106-10.
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B. Honig v. Doe
In Honig v. Doe, the Supreme Court distinguished Lyons as inapplicable
to a case in which a plaintiff had mental or physical conditions that made
him likely to engage in conduct that would, in turn, result in wrongful
government conduct.1 7 The Honig Court characterized Lyons as among a
series of cases in which the Court was "unwilling to assume that the party
seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again
place him or her at risk of that injury."' 8 Thus, in Lyons, the Court was
unwilling to assume that Lyons would be stopped again for a traffic
violation or, if stopped, that he would engage in the type of conduct that
would provoke the police to place him in a chokehold.' 09
The central plaintiff in Honig was quite different from the plaintiff in
Lyons. In Honig, plaintiff Jack Smith was an emotionally disabled or
disturbed adolescent "unable to govern his aggressive, impulsive
behavior.""' Every state receiving federal funds must comply with the
procedural safeguards of the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA")
which requires each state to ensure a "free appropriate public education" for
all disabled children within the state's jurisdiction."1  The statute
accomplishes this goal by ensuring parental participation in educational
decisions of their disabled children and allowing the parents to appeal
contested school decisions." 2 In particular, the EHA contains a "stay-put"
provision, which mandates that a disabled child "'shall remain in [his or
her] then current educational placement' pending completion of any review
proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies
otherwise agree." "' Despite the "stay put" provision in the EHA, officials
in the San Francisco Unified School District ("SFUSD") unilaterally and
indefinitely suspended Smith, whom the school system had identified as an
emotionally disturbed child within the protection of the EHA, from his
classroom for misconduct without complying with the procedural
requirements of the EHA. "'
After Smith and a similarly situated adolescent, John Doe, filed suit in
federal district court, the district court entered summary judgment in favor
of the two adolescent plaintiffs and issued injunctions against the SFUSD
107. 484 U.S. 305, 320-22 (1988).
108. Id. at 320.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-01 (2006).
112. Honig, 484 U.S. at 308-12 (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415).
113. Id. at 308 (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)).
114. Id. at 314-15.
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and the State of California forbidding them from suspending any disabled
child for more than five days, as long as the misconduct was related to the
child's disability. 15 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit generally
affirmed the district court's orders with the modification that a suspension
for up to thirty days was permissible.'16 The Supreme Court concluded that
John Doe's case was moot because he was twenty-four and therefore
outside the age limits of the EHA, which applies to disabled children
between the ages of three and twenty-one, but that Smith's case was not
moot since he was twenty and had not completed high school.1 7 While
Smith no longer resided within the SFUSD, he still resided in California and
was eligible to attend California public schools within the scope of the
challenged injunctions.118
Based on his history of emotional problems and misconduct, the
Supreme Court concluded that it was reasonable to assume that Smith
would again engage in similar misconduct when he returned to the
classroom because he was unable to control his behavior problems." 9
Furthermore, the Court also found it "equally probable" that if Smith
engaged in misconduct that school officials would once again seek to
unilaterally remove him from the classroom without complying with the
EHA. 20 California's Superintendent of Public Instruction acknowledged
that local school districts would unilaterally remove students with conduct
similar to Smith's if the injunction was overturned by the Court. 2' Unlike
Lyons, the Honig Court concluded Smith could sue for injunctive relief to
prevent future wrongful conduct because he "has demonstrated both 'a
sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way,' and
that any resulting claim he may have for relief will surely evade our review"
unless the Court decided the case before he was harmed again by the
defendant. 122
In Church v. City of Huntsville,1 2 1 the Eleventh Circuit argued that Honig
was essentially a case that clarified and distinguished the scope of Lyons
regarding when it is appropriate for a federal district court to issue an
injunction against the government for civil rights violations:
115. Id. at 315-16.
116. Id. at 316-17 (discussing Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986)).
117. Id. at 318.
118. Id. at 318-20.
119. Id. at 320-21.
120. Id. at 321.
121. Id. at 321-22.
122. Id. at 323 (internal citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 111 (1983)).
123. 30 F.3d 1332 (llth Cir. 1994).
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Jurisdictionally, Honig and Lyons are analogous. In each case, the
plaintiff suffered a discrete injury in the past and sued to enjoin
future recurrences of that wrong. The plaintiffs ability to
prosecute the action turned solely on the prospects that the
defendant would wrong the plaintiff in a similar manner in the
future. Thus, for present purposes, the relevant question is whether
this case resembles Honig, where the Court found that a
recurrence was sufficiently likely, or Lyons, where the Court held
the risk of repeated injury to be too speculative. 
124
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the Honig decision might seem
like it is procedurally different from Lyons because the Honig majority only
mentioned the standing doctrine in passing and focused on whether the case
was moot.125 Nevertheless, the Church court concluded that the two
Supreme Court cases were procedurally similar enough to be compared to
each other because the Honig Court implied that Smith had standing when it
concluded that his case was not moot and when it determined that he was
likely to be subject to harmful conduct in the future.1 26 The Church court
persuasively argued that the Honig decision distinguished Lyons by
demonstrating that prospective injunctive relief against the government is
appropriate in some cases where: (1) a plaintiff has repeatedly engaged in
certain conduct in the past, (2) the government has illegally punished the
plaintiff for that conduct, (3) the plaintiff will likely engage in that conduct
in the future, and (4) the government will likely punish him again for
engaging in that conduct. 127 Accordingly, a plaintiff can obtain injunctive
relief against the government based on past injuries if he or she can make a
persuasive case that the government is likely to cause him or her future
injury as in Honig.
C. Church v. City of Huntsville
In Church, a group of homeless persons filed a class action suit in the
federal district court, pursuant to § 1983,128 against the city of Huntsville,
Alabama alleging that it had a policy of arresting and harassing them, in
violation of their constitutional rights, as a part of a strategy to drive them
out of the city. 129 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
124. Id. at 1337-38 n.2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1337-38; see also infra Part III.C.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
129. 30 F.3d at 1335, 1339.
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prohibit the allegedly unlawful arrests, "as well as compensatory damages
for loss of property and emotional distress."' 3 ° The district court granted
preliminary injunctive relief against Huntsville and its employees barring
them from "implementing a policy of isolating and/or removing members of
the defined class from the City of Huntsville simply because of their status
as homeless persons."' 31 The district court also enjoined Huntsville officials
from arresting or harassing homeless persons for using parks or other public
places in the City.'32 The Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal'33
"seeking vacation of the preliminary injunction." '134
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the homeless plaintiffs had standing
to seek injunctive relief against Huntsville's alleged policy of isolating or
removing homeless persons from the city or its public places.'35 Although
the defendants did not raise an issue with the plaintiffs' standing in the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit considered this issue sua sponte.'36 The
court of appeals determined that the defendant's failure to challenge the
plaintiffs' standing before the district court reduced the plaintiffs'
evidentiary burden in establishing standing because the defendant did not
put the plaintiffs on notice that they needed to address standing issues
during its hearing for a preliminary injunction before the district court. 137 In
light of the defendant's failure to challenge standing during the compressed
timeframe of a preliminary hearing, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned "that the
plaintiffs' standing should be judged on the sufficiency of the allegations of
the complaint, with any preliminary hearing evidence favorable to the
plaintiffs on standing treated as additional allegations of the complaint."' 38
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the case was
analogous to Lyons because any alleged wrongful conduct in the past by the
City's employees was insufficient to prove a "real and immediate threat"
that City employees were likely to harass or arrest them in the future. 1'9 The
Eleventh Circuit determined: "The situation in this case differs materially
from that in Lyons, because the plaintiffs here are far more likely to have
future encounters with the police than was Lyons."'' 40 Following the
130. Id. at 1335.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994).
134. Church, 30 F.3d at 1335.
135. Id. at 1335, 1337-39.
136. Id. at 1336.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1337.
140. Id.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
REVISITING THE LYONS DEN
rationale in Honig, the court of appeals reasoned that "the Supreme Court
has held that such reluctance is not warranted when, for reasons beyond the
plaintiff's control, he or she is unable to avoid repeating the conduct that led
to the original injury at the hands of the defendant." 141 Prior to the Honig
decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in Lynch v. Baxley, 42 had distinguished
Lyons by holding "that a mentally ill plaintiff had standing to seek an
injunction against Alabama's practice of detaining individuals in county
jails pending civil commitment hearings" because his mental condition
would likely lead his family to petition for involuntary commitment in the
future.143 Following the reasoning in Honig and Lynch while distinguishing
Lyons, the court of appeals in Church concluded that the homeless plaintiffs
had standing to seek injunctive relief against Huntsville to prohibit
harassment and arrests of homeless persons because as a result of the
"allegedly involuntary nature of their condition, the plaintiffs [could not]
avoid future 'exposure to the challenged course of conduct' in which the
City allegedly engage[d].'
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that "[t]he likelihood that
City officials will continue to respond to the plaintiffs' conduct in ways
similar to those described in the plaintiffs' complaint is also greater here
than in Lyons" because "[i]n this case, [unlike in Lyons], the plaintiffs
allege that municipal policy authorizes the constitutional deprivations that
they claim to have suffered at the hands of City officials."1 45 The Church
plaintiffs alleged that the City had a "custom, practice and policy of
arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for
engaging in the ordinary and essential activities of daily life in the public
places where Plaintiffs are forced to live."'' 46 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the Church allegations were distinguishable from those in
Lyons, where the City of Los Angeles had not authorized police to use
deadly chokeholds without provocation or in the absence of deadly force. 147
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the Church plaintiffs had
141. Id. at 1338.
142. 744 F.2d 1452, 1456-57 & nn.6-7 (11 th Cir. 1984).
143. Church, 30 F.3d at 1338 (discussing Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1456-57 &
nn.6-7 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
144. Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)).
145. Id. at 1338-39.
146. Id. at 1339 (internal quotations omitted).
147. See id. at 1337-39; supra Part II.A (discussing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983)).
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standing to seek injunctive relief.148 In the subsequent decision 31 Foster
Children v. Bush,149 a case involving a class action on behalf of all of the
"children in Florida's foster care system against the Governor of Florida,"
the Eleventh Circuit again distinguished the Lyons decision and followed
Church because the plaintiffs were involuntarily in the custody of the
defendants and could not avoid the defendants' alleged wrongful conduct. 150
D. The Ninth Circuit Distinguishes Lyons in Two Decisions.: LaDuke
and Thomas
1. LaDuke
In two significant decisions, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the standing
analysis in Lyons. First, in LaDuke v. Nelson,"' the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiffs, who were residents in migrant farm dwellings in the
greater Spokane "Sector," had standing to seek permanent injunctive relief
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to enjoin the
INS's alleged practice of conducting warrantless searches of such dwellings
without probable cause or articulable suspicion requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.152 After the plaintiffs filed a class action and the district court
certified them as a class, the district court found that the INS had engaged in
a "standard pattern" of warrantless and involuntary searches of farm labor
housing communities in the Sector.153 The district court issued an injunction
forbidding the INS from engaging in similar unconstitutional searches of
migrant farm housing. 154
On appeal, the INS challenged the plaintiffs' standing to bring suit for
injunctive relief under Article III of the Constitution because it maintained
that they had not shown a credible threat of recurrent injury as required by
Lyons and Kolender.'55 The Ninth Circuit in LaDuke distinguished Lyons
based on "the respective district court findings on the likelihood of recurrent
injury. The district court in Lyons made no finding of likely recurrence
148. See id. at 1337-39. On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to an injunction because they failed to establish that they were likely to prove that the
City had a policy or custom of arresting and harassing homeless persons. Id. at 1342-47.
149. 329 F.3d 1255 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
150. Id. at 1255, 1260-68.
151. 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
152. Id. at 1321, 1324-26.
153. Id. at 1321-22.
154. Id. at 1331-32.
155. Id. at 1322-24.
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while the district court in this case made a specific finding of likely
recurrence."' 56 Additionally, the LaDuke court observed that "the district
court in this case explicitly found that the defendants engaged in a standard
pattern of officially sanctioned officer behavior violative of the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights."'57 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that "the
Lyons opinion expressly noted the absence of any written or oral
pronouncements by the Los Angeles Police Department sanctioning the
unjustifiable application of the chokehold and pointed to the absence of
'any [record] evidence showing a pattern of police behavior' suggestive of
an unconstitutional application of the chokehold."' 58 Because the Supreme
Court had repeatedly upheld the appropriateness of injunctive relief by
federal courts to address a "pattern" of illicit law enforcement wrongdoing,
the LaDuke court concluded that it was appropriate for the district court in
this case to award injunctive relief because the pattern of illegal
enforcement distinguished the case from Lyons, where there was no proof in
the record of a pattern of wrongdoing.'59 The Ninth Circuit also
distinguished Lyons on the grounds that the injunction in its case did not
affect state or local law enforcement matters and, thus, did not implicate
federalism concerns about the role of federal courts in local law
enforcement issues.16° Furthermore, the court of appeals observed that its
case involved a certified class action, unlike Lyons, which involved a single
plaintiff."' Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that injunctive relief
was appropriate in the case. 62
2. Thomas
In Thomas v. County of Los Angeles,'63 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
Lyons, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to obtain injunctive relief
against county deputy sheriffs who allegedly mistreated minority residents
in a small geographic area within the Lynwood station of the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department"). 6 The plaintiffs,
who were predominately African-American and Hispanic residents of
156. Id. at 1324 (internal citation omitted) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 110 n.9 (1983); LaDuke v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 158, 164 (E.D. Wash. 1982)).
157. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 160).
158. Id. (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110 n.9).
159. Id. at 1324, 1326.
160. Id. at 1324-25.
161. Id. at 1325.
162. Id. at 1324-26.
163. 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1992).
164. Id. at 507-08.
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Lynwood, California, brought a § 1983165 class action in federal district
court alleging that the deputy sheriffs at the Sheriffs Department were
abusing the minority citizens.166 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
deputy sheriffs had engaged in "unlawful detentions and searches, beatings,
shootings, terrorist activities" involving threats to execute detained
suspects, "and destruction of property."' 167 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction ordering the entire Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department to review its policies concerning the use of force and to submit
to the court, in camera and under seal, copies of every report involving the
Sheriffs Department, although the plaintiffs had only sought injunctive
relief addressing the Lynwood station. "' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district's order affecting the entire Sheriffs Department
was overly broad in geographic and substantive scope and remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings.169
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Sheriffs Department relied primarily
upon Lyons to challenge the plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive relief.7 '
The Thomas court distinguished Lyons as a case involving "one citizen in a
very large city, [who] could not credibly allege that he would again be
detained by the police and again be the victim of a police chokehold."'' By
contrast, the Ninth Circuit observed that Thomas was factually
distinguishable from Lyons because the allegations involved far more
violations in a narrow six-by-seven block area and that some of the minority
residents alleged that they had been mistreated more than once by sheriff
deputies in the Department, unlike Lyons who was the alleged victim of
only one incident.1 72 Furthermore, the Thomas plaintiffs "alleged that the
misconduct is purposefully aimed at minorities and that such misconduct
was condoned and tacitly authorized by department policy makers."'' 7 3 On
the other hand, the Lyons Court found that the Los Angeles Police
Department did not condone the use of deadly chokeholds by officers,
unless they were the subject of a deadly force. 174 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in
Thomas distinguished Lyons on the basis of the greater number of alleged
acts of wrongdoing, the narrow geographic area in which the violations
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
166. Thomas, 978 F.2d at 505-06.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 506-07.
169. Id. at 506, 509-10.
170. Id. at 507.
171. Id. at 507-08.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 508.
174. See supra Part II.A.
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occurred, and the allegation that some residents were victims of multiple
cases of abuse. 175 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Lyons
because the Thomas plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriffs Department had a
policy encouraging abuse. 176 As a result, the Thomas court concluded that
the plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief.
177
E. The Fifth Circuit Distinguishes Lyons in the first Hill decision and
in Hernandez
1. Hill v. City of Houston
a. Background
In Hill v. City of Houston,178 a Fifth Circuit panel distinguished Lyons,
holding that a plaintiff who had been arrested four times for violating a
challenged ordinance faced a "credible threat" of future prosecutions that
gave him standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
1 79
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, and the Supreme Court
agreed that the plaintiff had standing, but neither decision addressed
Lyons. 8 ' On four different occasions between 1975 and 1982, Houston
police officers arrested Raymond Hill for violating a city ordinance that
prohibited citizens from interfering with police officers in the execution of
their duties.'81 Hill was never convicted, however, because the court either
found him not guilty or dismissed the case. 1812 Hill did not raise a direct
constitutional challenge in the state court to his prosecution under the
ordinance for his arrest in February 1982.183 Instead, he filed a separate
action in federal district court alleging the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance under the free speech provisions of the First Amendment of the
175. Thomas, 978 F.2d at 507-08.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 764 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g granted, 789 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc),
aft'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
179. Id. at 1161.
180. Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1104, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc),
affd, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987).
181. Hill, 764 F.2d at 1158-59, 1169. Section 34-11(a) of the Code of Ordinances of the
City of Houston, Texas, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any
manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty, or any
person summoned to aid in making an arrest." HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 34-11 (a) (1984).
182. Hill, 764 F.2d at 1158-59.
183. Id. at 1160.
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U.S. Constitution and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.184 The
district court held that Hill lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the ordinance. " Furthermore, the district court also concluded that, even
if Hill met the standing requirement, it would deny his claim for relief
because the ordinance was "neither overly broad, void for vagueness, nor
applied in an unconstitutional manner as to Hill's arrest in February
1982." 186
b. Panel Decision
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court in concluding that Hill had standing and that the ordinance violated
the First Amendment because its language was substantially overbroad,
although one judge filed a dissenting opinion. 187 The majority, in an opinion
written by Judge Rubin, distinguished Lyons as factually different and
concluded "that Hill has the requisites to standing defined in Lyons.' 88
Judge Rubin reasoned that the plaintiff had standing because Hill had
already been arrested four times, far more than Lyons's single arrest, and
Hill "steadfastly asserted that he intends to continue to act in a manner that
will subject him to further arrests under the ordinance."'189 Thus, the court
concluded, citing Lyons and Kolender:
Hill has shown, therefore, that he faces more than a "subjective
apprehension" of repeated injury; he faces a "credible threat" of
future criminal prosecutions under the ordinance that is more than
a mere speculative and remote possibility. Hill, therefore, clearly
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance on
First Amendment grounds. 190
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham "agree[d] with the
majority that Hill has standing to raise an overbreadth challenge, because
his challenge rests on the ordinance's application to hypothetical persons in
hypothetical cases."'' He was "troubl[ed], however, [by] the majority's
suggestion that Hill has standing to challenge the ordinance on vagueness
grounds as well" because Hill "was intimately familiar with the ordinance
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1159.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1161-65. But see id. at 1165-73 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1161 (majority opinion).
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983)).
191. Id. at 1172 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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and how it was applied by the Houston police prior to his 1982 arrest."'
9 2
Judge Higginbotham's standing discussion focused on the special standing
issues involved in First Amendment speech challenges and did not address
the more general standing issues related to the Lyons decision.'93
c. Rehearing En Banc
A majority of the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the Hill case en banc.
19 4
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Rubin held
that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance and that the ordinance in its present form was facially and
substantially overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.' 95 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham argued that
the Fifth Circuit should have affirmed the district court's opinion because
"the Houston ordinance was constitutionally applied to Raymond Hill for
his conduct on the Montrose streetcorner [sic]," and "his challenge to the
facial validity of the provision, which is based on the claim that the
ordinance threatens the constitutional rights of others, cannot be sustained"
because Texas courts could provide a limiting construction of the
ordinance's language that would meet First Amendment requirements. '96
Judge Rubin adopted a different standing analysis than he had used in his
panel opinion. He emphasized that liberal standing rules apply in First
Amendment challenges instead of the normal standing rule that a plaintiff
must demonstrate he is personally harmed. "' Because of the danger that
people who are harmed by the unconstitutional restrictions on free speech
will be afraid to challenge the government, a plaintiff may seek declaratory
or injunctive relief against an allegedly overbroad or vague law on behalf of
other persons whose speech is allegedly chilled by the law, without meeting
the usual injury requirement for standing.'98 Judge Rubin concluded: "Hill
clearly had sufficient standing to question the facial validity of the
ordinance. Hill's record of arrests under the ordinance and his adopted role
as citizen provocateur made his Article III standing to seek injunctive and
declaratory relief certain."'' In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham
essentially reiterated his argument in his panel dissenting opinion that Hill
192. Id. at 1172 n.4.
193. Id. at 1172 & n.4.
194. Id. at 1173.
195. Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1104, 1106-13 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc),
affd, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987).
196. Id. at 1114-28 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1106-07 (majority opinion).
198. Id. (citing Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984)).
199. Id. at 1107.
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had Article III standing to raise an overbreadth challenge on behalf of other
persons but that he did not have standing to raise a vagueness claim because
of his experience with the challenged ordinance.2"0
d. Supreme Court Affirms En Banc Decision in City of Houston v. Hill
In City of Houston v. Hill, the Supreme Court affirmed the en banc
decision that the Houston ordinance was an unconstitutionally overbroad
infringement on First Amendment rights of free speech.2"' While it did not
cite Lyons, the Court in a footnote concluded that Hill had standing because
he "has shown 'a genuine threat of enforcement' of the ordinance against
his future activities." ' 2 In determining that Hill had standing to sue, Justice
Brennan relied on the same factors as those articulated in the panel decision
in reasoning that Hill was likely to be arrested in the future.20 3 First, the
majority opinion observed that the likeliness of Hill being arrested in the
future was supported by "testimony of Hill's willingness to interrupt
officers in the future."20 4 Second, Justice Brennan found that it was likely
that the Houston police would arrest Hill in the future in light of the
"[d]istrict [c]ourt['s] finding that Hill [was] a gay rights activist who
claim[ed] that the Houston police ha[d] systematically harassed him as the
direct result of his sexual preferences., 20 5 Third, the majority noted "the fact
that Hill has already been arrested four times under the ordinance lends
compelling support to the threat of future enforcement."2 6 The Court
concluded: "We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that 'Hill's
record of arrests under the ordinance and his adopted role as citizen
provocateur' give Hill standing to challenge the facial validity of the
ordinance. 2 7 Although it did not discuss Lyons, the Court's application of
the three factors to determine that Hill faced a credible prospect of future
arrest could easily have been used to distinguish Lyons, as the panel
decision had concluded.208
200. Id. at 1121-28 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
201. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471-73 (1987).
202. Id. at 459 n.7 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974)).
203. Id. at 459-63; see supra Part III.E.1.b.
204. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459 n.7; see supra Part III.E. L.b.
205. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra Part III.E. 1.b.
206. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459 n.7; see supra Part III.E. 1.b.
207. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459 n.7 (quoting Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th
Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
208. See supra Part III.E. 1.b.
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2. The Fifth Circuit Distinguishes Lyons in Hernandez v. Cremer
In Hernandez v. Cremer, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Lyons in
affirming injunctive relief against the INS on behalf of a border entry
applicant who was denied entry to the United States despite presenting
documentary evidence of United States citizenship.2 9 Judge Higginbotham,
however, dissented on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to
injunctive relief in light of Lyons because it was too speculative whether
INS agents would deny the plaintiff entry to the United States in the
future. 10 Plaintiff "Carmelo Hernandez, a United States citizen born in
Puerto Rico . . . sought entry from Mexico into the United States at the
International Bridge at Del Rio, Texas., 21 1 Hernandez "presented a Puerto
Rican birth certificate and a union card with his social security number to
support his claim that he was a United States citizen," but the INS
immigration inspector, James Blake, was not satisfied that the documents
were valid and "processed Hernandez for an exclusion hearing before an
immigration judge. 21 2 Blake "did not schedule a hearing at the time
Hernandez was processed" and failed to annotate that he had provided
Hernandez with a list of legal aid organizations as required by the 1-122 INS
form given to applicants at the time of entry. 2 3 After Hernandez spent
forty-six days in Mexico repeatedly trying to reenter the United States,
another INS inspector was satisfied with his documentation and allowed
him to enter the United States without a formal hearing.21 4
Hernandez then sued in federal district court, seeking tort damages and
injunctive relief against Lee Cremer, "individually and as the INS officer in
charge of the Del Rio port of entry"; Blake, "individually and as an officer
of the INS"; the INS; and the United States. 2 5 The district court "dismissed
all claims against Cremer and Blake as well as the tort actions against the
INS and the United States. 21 6 The district court, however, issued an
injunction against the San Antonio District of the INS, "requiring that the
INS follow certain minimal procedures when an applicant for entry into the
United States presents documentary evidence which, if accepted as
authentic, would conclusively establish the applicant's United States
209. 913 F.2d 230, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1990).
210. Id. at 241 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 232 (majority opinion).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 232-33.
215. Id. at 233.
216. Id.
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citizenship. ' ' 217 The INS appealed to the Fifth Circuit arguing that voluntary
oral procedures it had adopted made the injunctive relief unnecessary.1 8
The court of appeals remanded the case back to the district court to
reconsider "the injunction in light of the new procedures.2 1 9 After a
hearing, "the district court [entered] a final decision, ordering that the
injunction initially entered remain in effect but authorizing the application
of the new INS procedures in lieu of the injunction. ' 2 ' The INS then
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
221
On appeal, the INS argued that Lyons barred injunctive relief because
Hernandez could not show that the INS agents would likely deny him future
entry in the United States.222 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Lyons because
Hernandez, unlike Lyons, had exercised a constitutional right and was
likely to exercise that right in the future. 23 The court of appeals stated:
We find a critical factual distinction between Lyons and the instant
case which dictate a different result. Hernandez (unlike Lyons)
was engaged in an activity protected by the Constitution. Although
at present Hernandez is safely inside the United States, he is a
United States citizen and is entitled to travel to and from Mexico
without deprivation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights.
We think there is at the very least a reasonable expectation that
Hernandez will exercise his right to travel.224
The Fifth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court's Honig decision had
stated that courts were reluctant to assume that a plaintiff injured during an
arrest would repeat that "misconduct.,225  The Hernandez decision
concluded that "[n]o such reluctance, however, is warranted here" regarding
Hernandez's exercise of his right to travel. 226 The court of appeals
explained: "The injury alleged to have been inflicted did not result from an
individual's disobedience of official instructions and Hernandez was not
engaged in any form of misconduct; on the contrary, he was exercising a






222. Id. at 234.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. Id. (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988)) (emphasis added by Fifth
Circuit).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
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determined that the plaintiff had standing because "there is a reasonable
expectation that Hernandez will be subject to the alleged deprivation of his
Fifth Amendment due process rights in the future., 2 8 An interesting
question addressed in Part VI is whether a plaintiff who has a statutory right
to visit a national park is entitled to the same relaxation of the Lyons test as
a plaintiff exercising a constitutional right like Hernandez. 229 Like
Hernandez and unlike Adolph Lyons, the plaintiffs in Summers were not
engaging in misconduct but were exercising a lawful right. 30
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham argued that the plaintiff
was not entitled to injunctive relief in light of Lyons because it was too
speculative whether INS agents would again deny the plaintiff entry to the
United States and that Hernandez's exercise of his constitutional right to
travel did not distinguish the case from Lyons.231 Judge Higginbotham
asserted:
With deference, I cannot agree that Lyons is distinguishable
because Hernandez was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct. Lyons also enjoyed a constitutional right not to be
subjected to the excessive force of the choke-hold. The decision in
Lyons does not rest on the legality or constitutional protection of
the plaintiffs conduct. Lyons instead mandates an inquiry into the
likelihood that the single plaintiff will incur the difficulty again.
Such an inquiry is compelled by basic notions of Article III
standing as well as by fundamental equitable principles controlling
the issuing of injunctions.232
Judge Higginbotham contended that Hernandez did not bring a class action
because "[t]he record is bereft of any suggestion that Hernandez's
experience was shared by others. 233 He concluded that the majority should
have "reverse[d] the district court's grant of an injunction. 234
F. The Second Circuit Distinguishes Lyons in Deshawn
In Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir, the Second Circuit
distinguished Lyons and concluded that the plaintiffs had standing because
"the challenged interrogation methods in this case [were] officially
228. Id. at 235.
229. See infra Part VI.D.
230. See infra Part VI.A.
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endorsed policies." '235 The parents of juveniles claimed that the New York
Police Department had illegally used coercive interrogation techniques
when questioning their children.236 The federal district court "denied [the]
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted [the] defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the ground that 'plaintiffs have not
established a federal cause of action.'
237
On appeal, the Second Circuit distinguished Lyons in "find[ing] that the
plaintiffs have standing to seek equitable relief. 23 8 First, the court of
appeals determined that the case was different from Lyons because "the
plaintiffs in this case allege that they, as a certified class, are likely to suffer
future interrogations by the Squad.2 39 Second, the Deshawn decision
reasoned that, "unlike Lyons, the plaintiffs in this case allegedly continue to
suffer harm from the challenged conduct because the information secured
by the Squad is used to enhance their cases and to obtain plea bargains. 4 °
Finally, the Second Circuit concluded that "this case is distinguishable
from Lyons because, in Lyons, there was no proof of a pattern of illegality
as the police had discretion to decide if they were going to apply a choke
hold and there was no formal policy which sanctioned the application of the
choke hold.""24 By contrast, the court of appeals in Deshawn determined
that the New York City Police Department ("Department") had an official
policy of using coercive interrogations against juveniles, that there was a
likelihood of recurring injury, and that the Department was planning to
expand this policy.242 Because the Department had an official policy
sanctioning the allegedly illegal interrogation practices, the Second Circuit
distinguished Lyons and concluded that the plaintiffs had standing. 43 On the
235. 156 F.3d 340, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1998).
236. Id. at 343-44.
237. Id. at 344 (quoting Deshawn E. v. Safir, No. 96 Civ. 5296 JSM, 1997 WL 107544, at




241. Id. at 344-45.
242. Id. at 345.
In contrast, the challenged interrogation methods in this case are officially
endorsed policies; there is a likelihood of recurring injury because the
Squad's activities are authorized by a written memorandum of understanding
between the Corporation Counsel and the Police Commissioner. In addition,
plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the New York Police Department "has plans
to and is in the process of instituting Detective Squads in the Family Court
buildings in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens."
Id. (quoting Complaint, Deshawn E. v. Safir, No. 96 Civ. 5296 JSM, 1997 WL 107544
(S.D.N.Y. March 10, 1997), afl'd, 156 F.3d 340 (1998)).
243. Id. at 344-45.
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merits, however, the Deshawn court held that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a violation of their Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
rights because the Department's interrogation techniques were not so
uniformly coercive to establish a per se, facial violation of those rights for
the entire class.244 The Court observed that individual plaintiffs could still
bring challenges on a case-by-case basis if coerced statements were used
against them in court, in violation of their constitutional rights.245
G. The Tenth Circuit Recognizes Standing to Enforce Statutory Rights
in Tandy
In Tandy v. City of Wichita, the Tenth Circuit held that the disabled bus
passengers had standing to seek prospective relief because there was a
"realistic threat" of future discrimination by Wichita's transit system against
disabled people in violation of their statutory rights.246 The Tandy plaintiffs
sued the City of Wichita, which operates the Wichita Metropolitan Transit
Authority ("Wichita Transit"), in federal district court for allegedly
violating the Rehabilitation Act 247 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA").248 They "alleged that Wichita Transit's fixed-
route bus system was intentionally inaccessible to and unusable by people
with disabilities., 249 "Each [plaintiff] sought injunctive relief, declaratory
relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorneys'
fees. ' 250  Several of the plaintiffs "were testing Wichita Transit's
compliance" with the two statutes and "did not reside in the Wichita
area."
251
The district court concluded that three plaintiffs, the "cross-appellees"
before the Tenth Circuit, had standing because they resided in the Wichita
area and regularly used the transit system.252 Conversely, seven other
244. Id. at 345-49.
245. Id. at 346-47.
246. 380 F.3d 1277, 1284-85, 1287-89 (10th Cir. 2004).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002).
248. 380 F.3d at 1280-90 (discussing Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000)). All of the plaintiffs met the statutory definition of "'qualified
individuals with a disability' within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act." Id. at
1280 n.2 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
249. Id. at 1280.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.; Tandy v. City of Wichita, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219-20 (D. Kan. 2002)
(explaining rationale for recognizing standing for Wichita residents who regularly use the transit
system, but denying standing to testers or infrequent users), affid in part, rev'd in part,
dismissed in part, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
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plaintiffs, the "cross-appellants" before the Tenth Circuit, did not have
standing because they were either "testers" who did not reside in the greater
Wichita area or resided in Wichita, but rarely used the transit system.253 The
district court "issued an injunction against Wichita Transit's continued use
of its policy of giving drivers the discretion to deny wheelchair-bound
passengers access to an accessible bus on an inaccessible route, reasoning
that this policy violates the ADA. 254
On appeal before the Tenth Circuit, the "cross-appellants" challenged the
district court's denial of their standing. 255 The City of Wichita cross-
appealed the district court's issuance of the injunction, contending that "the
injunction was unnecessary and [was] now moot because Wichita Transit's
fixed-routes ... [had] . .. become fully accessible to wheelchair users as of
April 2002"; however, Wichita did not appeal the district court's
determination "that its driver-discretion policy violated the ADA., 256 The
Tenth Circuit denied Wichita's appeal because it concluded that a losing
party's voluntary compliance with a district court's injunctive relief does
not require a court of appeals to vacate the injunction, unless the losing
party provides equitable considerations justifying vacatur, which Wichita
failed to offer.257
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of standing to four
of the "cross-appellants" because it concluded that some of the non-resident
"testers" and occasional but regular residential users faced a sufficiently
"realistic threat" of discrimination by the transit system. 258 For example, the
court of appeals concluded that Betty Allen, who uses a power chair as a
mobility aid, had standing to seek prospective relief because she was "under
a realistic threat of experiencing a lift malfunction during at least twenty
percent of her several yearly attempts to use Wichita Transit's buses.,
25 9
Similarly, the court of appeals determined that Wichita Transit's past failure
to provide Carolyn Jefferies, a deaf person, with workable
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf ("TDD") service to communicate
by phone established that she was "under a real and immediate threat of
repeated injury" in light of her avowed intention to use the TDD service
253. Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1280; Tandy, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20 (explaining rationale for
recognizing standing for Wichita residents who regularly use the transit system, but denying
standing to testers or infrequent users).
254. Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1280.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1280-81.
257. Id. at 1291-92.
258. Id. at 1283-89.
259. Id. at 1281, 1284-85 (footnote omitted).
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once a month in the future.26 ° Citing Lyons, the Tenth Circuit reasoned:
"Past exposure to wrongful conduct bears on whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury., 261 By referring to "repeated injury,"
the Tenth Circuit implicitly distinguished Lyons, which involved only one
injury.
262
Additionally, the Tandy court held that the testers can establish standing
to seek prospective relief.263 The court observed that "[t]he question
whether testers have standing to sue under the Rehabilitation Act and under
Title II of the ADA is an issue of first impression., 264 The Tenth Circuit
relied heavily on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,211 a case in which "the
Supreme Court held that an African-American tester who was given
misinformation about the availability of a rental property had alleged
sufficient injury in fact to support standing to sue under the" Fair Housing
Act ("FHA").266 The Tandy court explained that the Supreme Court in
Havens Realty had interpreted Congress's extension of the reach of the
FHA to "any person" denied a dwelling "to confer standing 'to the full
limits of Article III,' which includes tester standing." '267 The Tenth Circuit
observed that several courts of appeals decisions "have followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Havens Realty to hold that tester standing
exists under other anti-discrimination statutory provisions.,
268
Because both Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act broadly
prohibit discrimination against any "qualified individual" with a qualifying
disability, the Tandy court concluded that the reasoning in Havens Realty
that Congress intended the FHA to reach the full limits of Article III
standing, including tester standing, applied to those two statutes as well.269
The Tenth Circuit held that all of the testers in its case who planned to test
the system in the future had standing since they were all "'qualified
individuals with a disability' within the meaning of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act."'27 For example, the Tandy court cited Lyons in holding
260. Id. at 1282, 1288-89.
261. Id. at 1289 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
262. See infra Part VI.A.
263. 380 F.3d at 1285-88.
264. Id. at 1285.
265. 455 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1982).
266. Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1285-86 (discussing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 373-75 (1982)).
267. Id. at 1286 (quoting Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372-74).
268. Id. (citing Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2004);
Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2000); Watts v. Boyd
Props., Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1 1th Cir. 1985)).
269. Id. at 1286-87.
270. Id. at 1287.
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that Mike Goupil had "established the requisite injury in fact because he is
under a real and immediate threat of experiencing a lift malfunction" in
light of his plan to test the system several times per year and the evidence
that lift malfunctions occurred "twenty to thirty percent of the time.'
271
The Tenth Circuit followed Lyons in holding that Ann Donnell did not
have standing to seek "prospective relief against the driver's failure to call
out stops and failure to offer her a designated seat" because Wichita Transit
had a policy requiring drivers to call out stops. 27 2 Although there was
evidence that Wichita Transit's drivers "often" failed to call out stops and a
driver in the past had failed to call out stops for Donnell, the court of
appeals concluded that her claim must fail in light of Lyons because she
could not demonstrate that drivers would refuse to follow the official policy
requiring them to call out stops "or that all drivers always fail to offer
disabled passengers designated seats., 273 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
held that "Donnell has no standing to seek prospective relief requiring
drivers to call out stops or to offer designated seats. 274 The Tenth Circuit
appeared to presume that past mechanical failures such as lift malfunctions
or TDD failures would recur in the future but followed Lyons's reasoning
that past misconduct by government officials does not necessarily predict
their future behavior if the government subsequently adopts an official
policy prohibiting such misconduct in the future.275
H. Brief Summary of Lyons's Progeny
As will be discussed more fully in Part VI, Lyons has been distinguished
on several grounds by subsequent cases. First, the courts in the Kolender,
Thomas, and Hill decisions found a realistic or credible threat of future
harm when the plaintiffs alleged multiple past government violations of
their rights and distinguished Lyons by observing that it had only involved
one incident of harm.27 6 Second, the Honig and Hernandez decisions
differed from Lyons on the ground that the plaintiffs in those cases were
involved in legal conduct that was more likely to be repeated in the future,
whereas Adolph Lyons had engaged in illegal behavior that was less likely
271. Id. at 1287-88 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
272. Id. at 1288.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 1284-89.
276. See supra Parts III.A, III.D.2, III.E.I; infra Part VI.A; see generally Garrett, supra
note 86, at 1820-26 & n.43 (arguing post-Lyons cases use a flexible, individualized, fact-
specific inquiry in determining whether there is a credible threat of future harm, including
frequency of government misconduct).
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to be repeated.277 Third, the courts, in the Kolender, Honig, Church,
LaDuke, and Deshawn decisions, found a realistic or credible threat of
future harm when the plaintiffs alleged that the government had an official
policy or practice of condoning misconduct against them and, therefore,
distinguished Lyons, where the City had adopted a policy forbidding the use
of the challenged chokehold, except in justified situations. 278 Fourth, the
courts, in the Kolender, Honig, Church, LaDuke, Deshawn, and Tandy
decisions, found a credible or realistic threat of harm in part because the
government targeted a minority or disadvantaged group.27 9 On the other
hand, in Lyons, the Supreme Court did not find that the Los Angeles Police
Department had targeted minorities, even though African-American males
accounted for 75% of the chokehold deaths since 1975 despite constituting
only 9% of the Los Angeles population.28 ° Fifth, the courts, in all three Hill
decisions, appropriately adopted a more liberal approach to equitable
remedies than Lyons because Hill alleged that the Houston police had
violated his and others' fundamental First Amendment rights, to which
courts give greater protection than other constitutional or statutory rights.28
Part VI will examine whether any of these five ways of distinguishing
Lyons can be applied to the facts in Summers.
IV. LAIDLA W DISTINGUISHES LyoNS
282
A. Majority Decision
The Supreme Court distinguished Lyons in Laidlaw, a case involving
illegal mercury discharges that violated the defendant's permit but where
277. See supra Parts III.B, III.E.2; infra Part VIA; see generally Rudovsky, supra note 86,
at 1237 n.234 (stating plaintiff is more likely to demonstrate credible threat of future
government harm if the plaintiff is engaging in "protected activity"); Garrett, supra note 86, at
1825-26 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more likely to find a credible threat of future harm if the
plaintiff is engaging in law-abiding behavior as opposed to illegal behavior).
278. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 n.233 (stating plaintiff can demonstrate a
credible or realistic threat of harm by demonstrating that the harm was the product of a policy or
practice of government); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1821-25 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more
likely to find a credible threat of future harm if there is an official policy condoning that
misconduct); infra Part VI.B.
279. See Garrett, supra note 86, at 1826-29; infra Part VI.C.
280. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 115-16 & n.3 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 137.
281. See supra Part III.E. 1; infra Part VI.D.
282. Part IV's examination of Laidlaw builds upon my previous article on Summers, but
focuses more on the Laidlaw decision's discussion of Lyons. See generally Mank, Previous
Article on Summers, supra note 1.
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there was no actual proof of harm to the plaintiffs or evidence that they
would be harmed in the future by the pollution. 83 The plaintiffs argued that
they had standing to sue the defendant that discharged mercury into a river
because they avoided swimming or fishing in a river due to the fear of
possible harm from the mercury.284 The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs had standing even though they could not prove that the
concentrations of mercury were likely to harm them or the environment. 85
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs had suffered a sufficient
injury for Article III standing because their "reasonable concerns" about the
harmfulness of the mercury caused them to discontinue recreational use of
the river.2 86 The Court explained that the plaintiffs did not have to
demonstrate an actual injury to the environment from the pollution because
"[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing... is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.
287
The Laidlaw Court distinguished Lyons. 88 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, observed: "In Lyons, we held that a plaintiff lacked standing to
seek an injunction against the enforcement of a police chokehold policy
because he could not credibly allege that he faced a realistic threat from the
policy. 289  In response to Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, she
acknowledged that Lyons had required that standing for prospective relief
be based on the probability of future harm rather than a plaintiffs
subjective fear of that harm. 29' The Court observed: "In the footnote from
Lyons cited by the dissent, we noted that '[t]he reasonableness of Lyons'
fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly
283. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83
(2000); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 685.
284. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83; Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "the Cloak of a Standing
Inquiry": Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis,
29 CARnozo L. REV. 149, 181 (2007); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41;
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note T, at 685.
285. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83; Craig, supra note 284, at 181; Mank, Future
Generations, supra note 1, at 40-41; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at
685-86.
286. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; Mank, Future Generations, supra note T, at 40-41; Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 686.
287. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; Craig, supra note 284, at 181; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 685.
288. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184-85 (discussing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
106-08 (1983)).
289. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106-07 n.7) (emphasis added).
290. Id.
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unlawful conduct,' and his 'subjective apprehensions' that such a-recurrence
would even take place were not enough to support standing. ' 91
The Laidlaw Court concluded that the plaintiffs in its case faced a more
realistic threat of future harm than the plaintiff in Lyons.292 Contrasting
Adolph Lyons's mere subjective concern that he might be subject to a
police chokehold in the future with the acknowledged evidence of permit
violations in Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg distinguished the facts in Lyons by
focusing on the "undisputed" evidence "that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-
discharging pollutants in excess of permit limits-was occurring at the time
the complaint was filed., 293 She conceded that there was a subjective issue
in Laidlaw about whether the plaintiffs' avoidance of the river was
reasonable, but she concluded that their concerns were clearly reasonable,
or in other words, that they met the Lyons's realistic threat test.294 She
reasoned:
Unlike the dissent . . . we see nothing "improbable" about the
proposition that a company's continuous and pervasive illegal
discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents
to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would subject
them to other economic and aesthetic harms. The proposition is
entirely reasonable, the District Court found it was true in this
case, and that is enough for injury in fact.
295
The Laidlaw majority determined that the plaintiffs, in effect, faced a
"realistic threat" of harm under Lyons even though the Laidlaw majority
ultimately used a different "reasonable concerns" test. 96 The Laidlaw Court
observed that mercury is "an extremely toxic pollutant" and "that
repeatedly, Laidlaw's discharges exceeded the limits set by the permit" in
determining that the plaintiffs' avoidance of recreational activities was
based on "reasonable concerns" about potentially harmful pollution.2 97 Such
evidence arguably might meet Lyons's realistic threat test. Justice Scalia
argued, in his dissenting opinion, however, that the plaintiffs' evidence and
the Laidlaw majority's "reasonable concerns" test were both inconsistent
with the Lyons's realistic threat test.
298
291. Id. (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108 n.8).
292. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184-85.
293. Id. at 184.
294. Id. at 184-85.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 181-85.
297. See id. at 176, 181-83.
298. Id. at 199-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs,
Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REv. 377, 436 (2009)
(implying Laidlaw's broad standing approach is inconsistent with Lyons's narrow approach to
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B. Justice Scalia 's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
Thomas,' 99 criticized the majority's conclusion that injury to a plaintiff
without injury to the environment was sufficient for standing. He argued
that "[i]n the normal course" plaintiffs must demonstrate injury both to the
environment and themselves to have standing.3"0 He rejected the majority's
subjective "reasonable concerns" test as inconsistent with Lyons's "realistic
threat" test.3' Quoting Lyons, Justice Scalia contended: "Ongoing
'concerns' about the environment are not enough, for '[i]t is the reality of
the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the
plaintiffs subjective apprehensions."' 302 He asserted that the plaintiffs had
failed to present any realistic evidence that they were actually harmed by
Laidlaw's mercury discharges, stating:
At the very least, in the present case, one would expect to see
evidence supporting the affidavits' bald assertions regarding
decreasing recreational usage and declining home values, as well
as evidence for the improbable proposition that Laidlaw's
violations, even though harmless to the environment, are somehow
responsible for these effects. Plaintiffs here have made no attempt
at such a showing, but rely entirely upon unsupported and
unexplained affidavit allegations of "concern."
' 30 3
In his dissenting opinion in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia made a stronger
argument than he would in his subsequent Summers majority decision that
the Laidlaw plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any realistic threat of
present or future harm and that their fears of possible harm were closer to
Adolph Lyons's subjective apprehension that the Los Angeles Police
Department might harm him someday. 304 Additionally, Justice Scalia argued
that a plaintiff did not have standing to seek penalties from the defendant
payable to the United States Treasury based on the mere possibility that
standing); Mank, Previous Article on Summers, supra note 1, at Part VI (criticizing subjectivity
of Laidlaw's "reasonable concerns" standing test).
299. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
300. Id. at 199-200 (Justice Scalia conceded that it was "perhaps possible" for a plaintiff to
be injured even if the environment was not by, for instance, a loss of property value, as the
Laidlaw plaintiffs had too vaguely alleged, but "such a plaintiff would have the burden of
articulating and demonstrating the nature of that injury," a burden which he contended the
plaintiffs had failed to meet.).
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983)).
303. Id. (citation omitted).
304. Id. at 199-201.
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those penalties might deter future wrongful conduct by the defendant. 3 5 He
contended that a member of the general public who has not been harmed by
a defendant lacks sufficient personal injury to seek public penalties even
though he may indirectly benefit from a deterrent effect, along with other
members of the general public.3"6 Citing Lyons, Justice Scalia observed that
the "relief against prospective harm is traditionally afforded by way of an
injunction, the scope of which is limited by the scope of the threatened
injury."30 7 In other words, a private plaintiff only has standing to seek
prospective relief in the form of an injunction to the extent to which he is
personally likely to suffer harm in the future and not to the potential harm to
the general public.30 8 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for giving a
private plaintiff standing to seek a public remedy for general harm that did
not specifically injure him.309 In the absence of any specific private injury to
one of the plaintiffs or a realistic threat of any future injury to them, Justice
Scalia argued that only the government could sue the defendant for
penalties related to the permit violations. 310 He made a good argument that
the plaintiffs in Laidlaw did not face a "realistic threat" of future harm, and
thus, that the majority should have held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to seek prospective relief in Lyons. As will be discussed in Part V,
his interpretation and application of Lyons in Summers was less convincing
than his use of Lyons in his Laidlaw dissenting opinion.
V. SUMMERS
3 11
In Summers, several environmental organizations, collectively referred to
as "Earth Island," filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the
Forest Service ("Service") from applying regulations exempting salvage-
timber sales of less than 250 acres from the notice, comment, and appeal
process that Congress had required the Service to apply for "more
significant land management decisions."'3 12 In 1992, Congress enacted the
Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (the "Appeals
305. Id. at 202-09.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 204 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-07 & n.7).
308. Id. at 204-05.
309. Id. at 202-09.
310. See id. at 202-14 (arguing that private parties cannot sue as private attorneys general
to collect penalties for the public treasury in the absence of any injury, and thus implicitly, only
the government can bring such a suit).
311. Part TV's examination of Summers builds upon my previous article on Summers, see
supra note 1, but focuses more on the Summers decision's discussion of Lyons.
312. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147-48 (2009).
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Reform Act" or the "Act").3 13 The Act required the "Service to establish a
notice, comment, and appeal process for 'proposed actions of the Forest
Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource
management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974. ' ' '3"4 The "Service's regulations
implementing the Act [initially] provided that certain of its procedures
would not be applied to projects that the Service considered categorically
excluded from the requirement to file an environmental impact statement
(EIS) or an environmental assessment (EA)."315 Subsequently, the Service
adopted a rule, after notice and comment, categorically exempting "fire-
rehabilitation activities on areas of less than 4,200 acres, and salvage-timber
sales of 250 acres or less" from the notice, comment, and appeal process.316
In 2002, a "fire burned a significant area of the Sequoia National
Forest." '317 In 2003, the Service approved the Burnt Ridge Project
("Project"), "a salvage sale of timber on 238 acres damaged by that fire."3 8
In accordance with its rule applying a "categorical exclusion of salvage
sales of less than 250 acres, the Forest Service did not provide notice in a
form consistent with the Appeals Reform Act, did not provide a period of
public comment, and did not make an appeal process available" for the
Project.319
Earth Island and several other environmental groups filed suit to enjoin
the Service from selling timber from the Project without the notice,
comment, and appeal process specified in the Appeals Reform Act.3 20 "The
[d]istrict [c]ourt granted a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge
salvage-timber sale," and "the parties settled their dispute over the"
Project.32 ' Despite the government's argument that the plaintiffs lacked
standing as soon as they settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute, the district
court "adjudicate[d] the merits of [the plaintiffs'] challenges" by
313. Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-381, Tit.
11I, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006)).
314. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1612).
315. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) (2008) (notice and comment), 215.12(f) (2008)
(appeal)).
316. Id. (citing National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire
Management Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,824 (June 5, 2003)
(issued in FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 1909.15, ch. 30, § 31.2(11)); National Environmental
Policy Act Documentation Needed for Limited Timber Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598, 44,607
(July 29, 2003) (issued in FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 1909.15, ch. 30, § 31.2(13))).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1147-48.
320. Id. at 1148.
321. Id.
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invalidating five of the Service's regulations and entering "a nationwide
injunction against their application."3 2 "The Ninth Circuit held that [the
plaintiffs'] challenges to regulations not at issue in the ... Project were not
ripe for adjudication. 3 23 The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the district
court's conclusion that two regulations that "were applicable to the" Project
"were contrary to law" and, therefore, "upheld the nationwide injunction
against their application." '324
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
In Summers, Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, concluded that the
plaintiffs no longer satisfied the injury prong of the standing test once they
settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute.325 The plaintiffs had initially
satisfied the injury requirement when they submitted an affidavit alleging
that the "organization member, Ara Marderosian, had repeatedly visited the
Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to" visit the site again, and that
the government's actions would harm his aesthetic "interests in viewing the
flora and fauna" at the site.3 26 The settlement, however, had remedied
Marderosian's injury, and no other affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs
alleged that the Service's application of the challenged regulations was
causing a particular organization's member an imminent injury at a specific
site. 121
In its Summers decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
specifically addressed the question of probabilistic standing based on
potential future injuries to some of an organization's members rather than
actual or imminent injuries to particular members of an organization.328
Several environmental organizations challenged the government's sales as
harming their members.3 29 The largest membership organization among the
plaintiffs, the Sierra Club, asserted in its Complaint that it had "more than
'700,000 members nationwide, including thousands of members in
California' who [recreated in the] Sequoia National Forest," and, therefore,




325. Id. at 1149-50.
326. Id. at 1149.
327. Id. at 1149-51.
328. For a detailed discussion of statistical standing, see Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 748-52.
329. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147, 1151; accord id. at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing
the membership size of the various plaintiff organizations).
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regulations would harm at least one of its members.33 ° Justice Scalia
rejected the plaintiffs' probabilistic standing argument because "[t]his novel
approach to the law of organizational standing would make a mockery of
our prior cases, which have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific
allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or
would suffer harm." '331 He maintained that a court cannot rely on an
organization's general assertions about its members' activities and that the
Court's precedent required an organizational member to file an individual
affidavit confirming that he or she uses a specific site that the government is
affecting and that his or her recreational interests will be harmed by the
government's alleged failure to comply with legal requirements.332 The
Court observed that its precedent required individual members of an
organization to file affidavits affirming how each one is harmed or will be
imminently harmed by a challenged activity, unless all members of an
organization are harmed by an activity and that exception was clearly
inapplicable. 333
Because federal courts have an independent duty to assess whether
standing exists even if no party challenges standing, the Court reasoned that
a federal court must verify that standing exists by examining affidavits from
individual members to determine if he or she has suffered an actual injury
caused by the challenged activity.334 Justice Scalia argued: "While it is
certainly possible-perhaps even likely-that one individual will meet all of
these [standing] criteria, that speculation does not suffice." '335 The Court
concluded that none of the timely filed affidavits "establish[ed] that the
affiants' members will ever visit one of the small parcels at issue. 336
Justice Scalia concluded that none of the plaintiffs presented any credible
evidence that there was a "realistic threat" that they would be injured in the
future. 337 Besides Marderosian's affidavit, the only affidavit presented by
the plaintiffs was that of Jim Bensman.33 s Bensman "assert[ed] that he has
visited many" national parks, "had suffered injury in the past from
330. Id. at 1151 (quoting id. at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Complaint at 34 12,
Summers 129 S. Ct. 1142 (No. 07-46300)) (listing the membership size of the various plaintiff
organizations).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1151-52.
333. Id. at 1152 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958))
("all organization members affected by release of membership lists").
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 1153.
337. Id. at 1150-53.
338. Id. at 1150.
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development on Forest Service land," and "plann[ed] to visit several
unnamed National Forests in the future. '339 The Court rejected his affidavit
as insufficient in part because he could not identify any particular site where
he was likely to be harmed by timber sales or other actions authorized by
the challenged regulations .3" The Court stated:
It is a failure to allege that any particular timber sale or other
project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will
impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman's to enjoy the
National Forests. The National Forests occupy more than 190
million acres, an area larger than Texas. There may be a chance,
but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman's wanderings will bring
him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject
to the regulations. Indeed, without further specification it is
impossible to tell which projects are (in respondents' view)
unlawfully subject to the regulations.
Justice Scalia determined that Bensman's allegations of possible future
harm were weaker than Adolph Lyons's. The Court stated:
The allegations here present a weaker likelihood of concrete harm
than that which we found insufficient in Lyons, where . . . [w]e
said it was "no more than conjecture" that Lyons would be
subjected to that chokehold upon a later encounter. Here we are
asked to assume not only that Bensman will stumble across a
project tract unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the
tract is about to be developed by the Forest Service in a way that
harms his recreational interests, and that he would have
commented on the project but for the regulation. Accepting an
intention to visit the National Forests as adequate to confer
standing to challenge any Government action affecting any portion
of those forests would be tantamount to eliminating the
requirement of concrete, particularized injury in fact.342
Furthermore, the Court concluded that Bensman's assertion that he might
visit a forest where the Forest Service was allegedly conducting illegal
timber sales was insufficient. Justice Scalia stated:
The Bensman affidavit does refer specifically to a series of
projects in the Allegheny National Forest that are subject to the
339. Id.
340. Id. ("There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman's wanderings
will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the
regulations.").
341. Id. (citation omitted).
342. Id. (citations omitted).
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challenged regulations. It does not assert, however, any firm
intention to visit their locations, saying only that Bensman
"'want[s] to"' go there. This vague desire to return is insufficient
to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury: "Such 'some day'
intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed
any specification of when the some day will be--do not support a
finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require."
' 343
Thus, the Court concluded that none of the plaintiffs presented credible
evidence that they faced a realistic threat of future harm.344
The plaintiffs had sought to introduce additional affidavits, but the
majority rejected all late-filed affidavits introduced by the plaintiffs after the
district court entered its judgment and after the plaintiffs had filed a notice
of appeal. 14' The Court concluded that such late supplementation of the
record was inappropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure despite
the dissenting opinion's contrary view.3 46 Because it held that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate standing, the Court did not address the Government's
contention that the case was not "ripe for review" or whether a "nationwide
injunction would [have] be[en] appropriate" if the plaintiffs had
prevailed.347
B. Justice Kennedy 's Concurring Opinion
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that he joined
in full the opinion of the Court because a plaintiff can challenge the alleged
violation of a procedural right only if he can demonstrate a separate
concrete injury arising from that violation and that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove such a concrete injury.3 48 He observed that "[t]his case would
present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress
for a concrete injury 'giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before."'349 Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice
Kennedy had argued that Congress had the authority to confer citizen
343. Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (No. 07-463); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
344. Id. at 1151-53.
345. Id. at 1153.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
349. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
REVISITING THE LYONS DEN
standing in at least some situations to address new types of injury, not
recognized by the common law, to meet Article III standing requirement, so
long as Congress carefully defined the type of injury it sought to remedy.35
He concluded, however, that the statute at issue in the Summers case did not
include an express citizen suit provision "indicat[ing] [that] Congress
intended to identify or confer some interest separate and apart from a
procedural right. 35'
In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fair Housing Act to
reach the outer limits of Article III standing because Congress intended that
statute to extend to those limits to protect minorities from housing
discrimination.352 In particular, the Court allowed tester standing.353 In light
of Havens Realty, Justice Kennedy's view that congressional intent is a
factor in whether a statute reaches the outer limits of Article III standing is
reasonable. More controversially, Justice Kennedy suggested in both his
Summers and Lujan concurrences that Congress has some constitutional
role in defining the murky boundaries of Article III standing so long as the
national legislature clearly defines the class of injury it seeks to rectify.354 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court stated that it agreed with his general view
that Congress has some authority to define what constitutes an Article III
injury.
355
350. Kennedy argued in Lujan:
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. In
exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons
entitled to bring suit.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citation
omitted).
351. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
352. See supra Part III.G.
353. See supra Part III.G.
354. See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); supra notes 350, 352 and
accompanying text.
355. The Court stated:
Congress has moreover authorized this type of challenge to EPA action. That
authorization is of critical importance to the standing inquiry: "Congress has
the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before .... In exercising this
power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring
suit." We will not, therefore, "entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws."
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516-17 (2007) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (citations omitted).
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Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, read Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion as implying that Congress has the authority to allow
probabilistic organizational standing if a statute, especially one containing a
citizen suit provision,356 carefully specifies when such an organization may
sue.357 Justice Breyer observed that if Congress had expressly enacted a
statute allowing standing for parties injured by salvage sales in the past to
have standing if they are likely to use salvage parcels in the future "[t]he
majority cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be
unconstitutional." '358 It is possible that public interest organizations will
lobby Congress to amend statutes to give them standing in similar cases in
the future to test Justice Breyer's interpretation of Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion.359
C. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer relied on Lyons in proposing a
"realistic threat" test for assessing when an injury is sufficient for
standing.36° He argued that the plaintiffs, who collectively have more than
700,000 members in the United States, had standing to sue because their
members were likely to be affected by the government's allegedly illegal
salvage timber sales in the future.361 Because members of the organizations
had been harmed in the past by timber sales which took place without
legally required notice and comment, and the Service planned thousands of
356. Several citizen suit statutes allow "any person" to sue as private attorneys general. See,
e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2006); Toxic
Substances Control Act § 119, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)
(2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Safe Water
Drinking Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §
702, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006); Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at n.8 1.
357. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To understand the
constitutional issue that the majority decides, it may prove helpful to imagine that Congress
enacted a statutory provision that expressly permitted environmental groups like the
respondents here to bring cases just like the present one."); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 750-51.
358. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note T, at 751.
359. Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 751.
360. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 1153-55. The plaintiff Sierra Club has more than 700,000 members, Earth Island
Institute has over 15,000 members, and the Center for Biological Diversity has over 5,000
members in the United States. Id. at 1154.
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sales in the future, Justice Breyer concluded that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a realistic threat that they would be harmed in the future.
3 62
Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt Lyons's realistic threat
test in deciding when a plaintiff who has been injured in the past has
standing for a future injury.363 He argued that the majority had too narrowly
construed the term "imminent" to reject standing even though previous
decisions had used that term to deny standing only in situations where the
alleged harm "was merely 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical' or otherwise
speculative. 364 Justice Breyer contended that the majority's use of the
"imminent" test was inappropriate where "a plaintiff has already been
subject to the injury it wishes to challenge," as the plaintiffs had in the case
at issue, and "there is a realistic likelihood that the challenged future
conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff. 3 65 He relied on Lyons,
where the Court stated that the plaintiff, Adolph Lyons, "would have had
standing had he shown 'a realistic threat' that reoccurrence of the
challenged activity would cause him harm 'in the reasonably near
future.' 3 66 Justice Breyer maintained that the Court's standing precedent
required only a "realistic threat" for standing based upon a future threat of
injury and did not require a plaintiff to meet "identification requirements
more stringent than the word 'realistic' implies. 3 67 Thus, while he
conceded that plaintiffs could not predict which specific tracts of fire-
damaged land the Service would sell as salvage timber, he reasoned that
there was a "realistic threat" that a member of the plaintiff organizations
would be harmed by a Forest Service sale, and, accordingly, that the
plaintiffs were entitled to standing under the Court's precedent.
3 68
Justice Breyer maintained that the Court had implicitly used a realistic
threat test for standing in several other areas of law. He asked:
Would courts deny standing to a holder of a future interest in
property who complains that a life tenant's waste of the land will
almost inevitably hurt the value of his interest-though he will
have no personal interest for several years into the future? Would
362. Id. at 1155-58.
363. Id. at 1155-56.
364. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note T, at 750.
365. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 750.
366. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7, 108 (1983) (emphasis added by Justice Breyer)).
367. Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982)).




courts deny standing to a landowner who complains that a
neighbor's upstream dam constitutes a nuisance--even if the harm
to his downstream property (while bound to occur) will not occur
for several years? Would courts deny standing to an injured person
seeking a protection order from future realistic (but
nongeographically specific) threats of further attacks?
369
Justice Breyer argued that "a threat of future harm may be realistic even
where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates, and GPS
coordinates., 37" Relying on the Massachusetts decision, he reasoned that
"we recently held that Massachusetts has standing to complain of a
procedural failing, namely, EPA's failure properly to determine whether to
restrict carbon dioxide emissions, even though that failing would create
Massachusetts-based harm which (though likely to occur) might not occur
for several decades. 37'
Justice Breyer argued that there was a realistic threat that the plaintiffs
would be injured in the future because the government conceded that the
Service would "conduct thousands of further salvage-timber sales. 372 It was
likely that these sales would harm some members of the plaintiff
organizations. 373 For instance, Bensman stated in an affidavit that he had
visited seventy national forests and had "visited some of those forests
'hundreds of times. ', 74 Although his affidavit did not state "which
particular sites will be affected by future [] Service projects," Justice
Breyer concluded that there was a realistic threat that Bensman would be
affected by one of the thousands of future Service timber sales that do not
follow mandatory procedural rules.375 Justice Breyer offered a persuasive
analogy, stating: "To know, virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New
England this winter is not to know the name of each particular town where
369. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1156 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007)). There has
been uncertainty, however, about whether Massachusetts's liberal approach to standing for
future injuries applies only to state plaintiffs or all plaintiffs. See Mank, States Standing, supra
note 1, at 1746-47, 1786 (discussing uncertainties about whether standing analysis in
Massachusetts applies only to states or to all plaintiffs). Some portion of the Massachusetts
decision appears to apply to all procedural plaintiffs, but the definition and scope of what are
procedural rights is uncertain. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18; Mank, States Standing,
supra note 1, at 1727 (arguing "some possibility" standard in Massachusetts applies to all
procedural plaintiffs); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1747-52 (arguing definition and
scope of procedural rights exception is uncertain).
372. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1157.
375. Id. at 1156-57.
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it is bound to arrive. The law of standing does not require the latter kind of
specificity.
3 76
Furthermore, Justice Breyer argued that the majority had wrongly
excluded the affidavits filed by the plaintiffs after they settled the Burnt
Ridge dispute.377 He explained that the plaintiffs had not originally filed
more affidavits because the need for additional affidavits only became
apparent when they settled the original Burnt Ridge dispute.378 He
contended that no law prohibited the filing of additional affidavits.379
Additionally, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(d) empowers a district
court judge with liberal discretion to amend a complaint and, hence, allow
additional affidavits "even after one dispute .. .is settled. 3180 Because the
affidavits identified a number of pending salvage timber sales in areas that
the affiants frequently visited and planned to visit again in the near future,38" '
Justice Breyer contended that these affidavits clearly demonstrated a
"'realistic threat' of injury to plaintiffs brought about by reoccurrence of the




Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer disagreed whether to establish an injury
in fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate, as Justice Scalia argued for the
majority, exactly when and how he will be injured by the government's
allegedly illegal actions, or, as Justice Breyer argued, that it is enough for a
plaintiff to allege sufficient facts that he will probably be injured by the
government actions. The difference in their approaches is evident in the
divergent ways they interpreted and applied Lyons to the facts in Summers.
According to Justice Scalia, the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in Summers
were weaker than those in Lyons because it was mere speculation that
"Bensman will stumble across a project tract unlawfully subject to the
regulations, but also that the tract is about to be developed by the Forest
Service in a way that harms his recreational interests, and that he would
have commented on the project but for the regulation." '383 Based upon his
376. Id. at 1157.
377. Id. at 1157-58.
378. Id.




383. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
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interpretation that Lyons requires a plaintiff to establish with certainty that
he would be subject to a future harm, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Summers plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury because they could not
prove when a member of their organization would be harmed at a specific
site by the government's failure to follow notice and comment procedures
with a particular fire salvage sale.
By contrast, Justice Breyer argued that Lyons only required a plaintiff to
demonstrate a "realistic threat" of future injury. According to Justice
Breyer, the Summers plaintiffs met the "realistic threat" test because the
facts alleged by the plaintiffs demonstrated that one of their thousands of
members who regularly used federal forest lands would be harmed in the
reasonably near future by one of the thousands of fire salvage sales
conducted by the Service.385 In particular, it seemed likely that Bensman
would be harmed because he regularly traveled to numerous Service forest
properties.386
VI. APPLYING LYONS, KOLENDER, HoNG, AND RELATED LOWER COURT
DECISIONS TO SUMMERS
The debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer in Summers about
the meaning of Lyons's realistic threat test would have been better informed
if they had discussed Kolender, Honig, and the lower court decisions
discussed in Part III of this Article that either directly, implicitly or
indirectly distinguished Lyons. Justice Breyer provided more examples than
Justice Scalia of what might constitute a "realistic threat" in other areas of
the law and related those examples back to the facts in Summers.387 Even
Justice Breyer did not grapple, however, with the progeny of Lyons.
Likewise, the Laidlaw majority and Justice Scalia in that case simply
discussed the "realistic threat" test in Lyons in isolation, without addressing
how the Court or lower courts had applied that test over the years.388
One plausible reason that the Summers and Laidlaw majority and
dissenting opinions did not examine Lyons's progeny is that those cases
involved statutory environmental issues and the latter cases involved
constitutional, criminal justice, or disability rights that might appear to be
384. Id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 107 n.7 (1983) (emphasis added by Justice Breyer)).
385. Id. at 1156-58.
386. Id. at 1157.
387. See supra Parts V.A, V.C.
388. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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quite different from environmental issues.38 9 Nevertheless, both the
Summers and Laidlaw decisions were willing to use Lyons's realistic threat
test for prospective standing and at least to some extent compare Lyons's
facts to their quite different environmental situations.390 Accordingly, if the
Court in Summers and Laidlaw was willing to use Lyons's realistic threat
test for prospective standing then they should also have been willing to
explore how that test had been used in subsequent cases, even if none of
those cases involved environmental statutes. The Supreme Court has
generally treated standing as an overarching, trans-substantive jurisdiction
question separate from substantive law, and, therefore, it is appropriate for
courts to apply the same standing considerations to cases involving different
substantive law.391
Part VI will consider how the facts in Summers compare with those in
Lyons and with the cases discussed in Part III. First, Mr. Bensman, the
affiant in Summers, was more likely than the plaintiffs in Lyons and many,
but not all, of the plaintiffs discussed in Part III to suffer future injury.392
Unlike Lyons who had suffered one wrongful act in the past and was
unlikely to suffer a similar wrong in the future, Bensman could demonstrate
that he had made numerous visits to many different national parks and
forests.3 93 Accordingly, Bensman was likely in the future to visit one of the
many forests where the Service was selling timber without adhering to the
allegedly required procedural safeguards.394 Second, unlike Adolph Lyons
who violated the law in operating a motor vehicle without a taillight and
who might not repeat that illegal conduct in the future, Bensman was
engaging in legal conduct when he visited national forests.395 Third, unlike
Lyons, where the Los Angeles Police Department during the pendency of
Adolph Lyons's lawsuit had adopted an official policy prohibiting the use
of a chokehold without provocation, the Service had not adopted any policy
prohibiting the sale of fire-damaged timber in lots less than 250 acres
without following arguably required procedural safeguards.3 96
389. See supra Parts II, IV, V.
390. See supra Parts II, IV, V.
391. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 576 (1992) (concluding it is irrelevant for Article III standing whether the underlying
substantive issue was a constitutional or statutory matter); Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2251-52
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court treats standing as a trans-substantive jurisdictional
question, but criticizing that approach).
392. See supra Part III.H; infra Part VI.A.
393. See supra Part III.H; infra Part VI.A.
394. See supra Part III.H; infra Part VI.A.
395. See supra Part III.H; infra Part VI.A.
396. See supra Part III.H; infra Part VI.B.
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Some of the cases in Part III are more compelling than Summers because
the plaintiffs were disabled persons or persecuted minorities who could not
avoid harmful government behavior.397 Although some plaintiffs might have
more compelling cases than Bensman, there is no reason to deny him
prospective relief because he voluntarily exercised his statutory right to visit
the national parks and forests. 398 Another issue is whether plaintiffs, like
those in Summers, who seek to enforce statutory rights have a lesser right to
standing than plaintiffs seeking to enforce constitutional rights. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia concluded it is irrelevant for Article III
standing whether the underlying substantive issue was a constitutional or
statutory matter despite the objections of some commentators who have
criticized his trans-substantive approach to standing.3 99 Only in First
Amendment speech cases are plaintiffs entitled to significantly relaxed
standing requirements.4"0 In all other constitutional and statutory challenges,
plaintiffs must meet Lujan's standing test of demonstrating a personal,
concrete injury in fact rather than a violation of the Constitution or statute
that harms the public at large. 4 1 While they were not entitled to the special
standing rights in First Amendment speech cases, the plaintiffs in Summers,
nevertheless, demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of injury to meet Lyons's
realistic threat standing test.
40 2
A. Courts Usually Are More Willing to Grant Prospective Injunctive
Relief to Plaintiffs who Have Suffered Repeated Injuries in the Past and
Engaged in Legal Conduct
The Court in Lyons emphasized that Adolph Lyons was the victim of
only one incident of alleged police misconduct, although his injuries were
quite severe. 4 3 By contrast, a few days later, the Supreme Court, in
Kolender, concluded that a plaintiff who had been arrested or detained
fifteen times faced a credible threat of future arrests and, therefore, upheld
397. See infra Part VI.C.
398. See infra Part VI.C.
399. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (concluding it is
irrelevant for Article III standing whether the underlying substantive issue was a constitutional
or statutory matter); Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2251-52 (acknowledging that the Supreme
Court treats standing as a trans-substantive jurisdictional question, but criticizing that
approach); supra note 23 and accompanying text.
400. See Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2240-41; infra Part VI.D.
401. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 573-74, 576 (1992); id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2240-41; supra Part I; infra Part VI.D.
402. See supra Part I; infra Part VI.D.
403. See supra Part II.
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the lower court's prospective injunctive relief.404 Clearly, the Court in Lyons
and in Kolender thought that the harm was more likely to recur in the future
to someone who had been harmed fifteen times in the past than to someone
who had been harmed only once, assuming there was not a significant
change in the circumstances since the harm took place.4"5
Lower court decisions have also focused in part on the number of prior
wrongful incidents.40 6 In Hill, both the lower courts and the Supreme Court
took note of the fact that Hill had been arrested four times in determining
that he had standing to seek prospective relief.4 7 Similarly, in Thomas, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs who had been repeatedly arrested in
a small geographic area had standing to seek injunctive relief because the
likelihood of recurring injury to them was stronger than in Lyons where
Adolph Lyons argued that he and a few other people had been victims of
illegal police chokeholds over a much larger geographic area and population
base.40 8
In Summers, Bensman stated in his affidavit that he had visited seventy
national forests, some of them hundreds of times.4 9 It is true that Bensman
could not identify which of the forests that he would visit in the future
would be subject to illegal Service timber sales. 4'0 Nevertheless, in light of
the sheer number of times that Bensman visited national forests, it seemed
far more likely that Bensman would in the future visit a forest where
procedurally questionable timber sales were proceeding than that Lyons
would commit an illegal act that in turn would result in him being the
victim of an unprovoked chokehold in the future.411
Another difference between Lyons and Summers supports prospective
relief in the latter case. Courts are much more likely to grant equitable relief
if a plaintiff is engaging in legal, protected activity than in illegal activity
404. See supra Part M.A.
405. See supra Part III.A.
406. See supra Parts III.D.2, III.E. 1, V.C; see generally Garrett, supra note 86, at 1820-26
& n.43 (arguing post-Lyons cases use a flexible, individualized, fact-specific inquiry in
determining whether there is a credible threat of future harm, including frequency of
government misconduct).
407. See supra Part IiI.E.1.
408. See supra Part III.D.2.
409. See supra Part V.C.
410. See supra Parts V.A, V.C.
411. Compare supra Part V.C (discussing Justice Breyer's argument that Bensman's
numerous visits to national parks and forests established a "realistic threat" of future harm), and
supra Part III.E.1 (discussing lower court's and Supreme Court's conclusion that Hill's four
past arrests demonstrated credible threat of future harm), with supra Part II (discussing Supreme
Court's conclusion in Lyons that one prior incident of government misconduct was insufficient
to predict future government misconduct).
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because judges are more likely to assume that a plaintiff will engage in
lawful activity in the future than unlawful activity, unless there is a
persistent pattern of arrests as in Kolender.1 2 Thus, courts are more likely to
accept that a future harm may recur in cases where the plaintiff is engaging
in legal conduct.41 3 According to the Supreme Court's Honig decision and
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hernandez, the Lyons decision was reluctant
to assume that Lyons would again engage in illegal conduct that would
result in an arrest that in turn might expose him to the risk of a police
chokehold.4"4 By contrast, Bensman was and would be engaging in legal
conduct when visiting national forests.41 5 Presumptively, because it is more
likely that most people will engage in legal conduct than in illegal conduct,
it is reasonable to presume that Bensman is more likely to visit a national
park than that Lyons would be arrested, let alone be subject to chokehold
without provocation on his part.41 6 Courts have been willing to assume that
a plaintiff will engage in illegal conduct in the future only if the plaintiff is
among a class of people likely to be arrested, such as the vagrant plaintiff in
Kolender and the immigrant plaintiffs in Hernandez, or where the plaintiff
had sincerely declared that he intends to violate a law with which he
disagrees, as in Hill.
417
Because Bensman had repeatedly engaged in the legal behavior of
visiting national forests and parks in the past, it was reasonable to expect he
would do so in the future.4"' Since the Forest Service planned so many
arguably illegal timber sales in the future, Justice Breyer was right to argue
that Bensman faced a realistic threat of future harm. 419 Justice Scalia was
wrong when he argued that Bensman's allegations presented a weaker case
412. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 & n.234 (stating plaintiff is more likely to
demonstrate credible threat of future government harm if the plaintiff is engaging in "protected
activity"); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1825-26 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more likely to find a
credible threat of future harm if the plaintiff is engaging in law-abiding behavior than illegal
behavior).
413. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 & n.234 (stating plaintiff is more likely to
demonstrate credible threat of future government harm if the plaintiff is engaging in "protected
activity"); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1825-26 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more likely to find a
credible threat of future harm if the plaintiff is engaging in law-abiding behavior than illegal
behavior).
414. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 234
(5th Cir. 1990); supra Parts III.B, III.E.2.
415. See infra Part VI.D.
416. See Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 234-35 (reasoning that plaintiff Carmelo Hernandez was
more likely in the future to engage in legal right to travel than Adolph Lyons was to engage in
illegal conduct in the future); supra Part III.E.2.
417. See supra Parts III.A, III.E. 1-2.
418. See supra Part V.C.
419. See supra Part V.C.
[Ariz. St. L.J.892
REVISITING THE LYONS DEN
for prospective relief than Lyons, who had only been harmed once in the
past for illegal conduct that might not recur in the future.42°
B. Official Policy of Wrongdoing
In Lyons, the Court emphasized that the Los Angeles Police
Department's official policy restricting the use of chokeholds made it
unlikely that its officers would again subject Adolph Lyons to a chokehold
without provocation. 42' The Court assumed that most officers would follow
the official policy in conducting their duties.422 Thus, whether the
government's allegedly wrongful actions are in contradiction or in accord
with official policy is a crucial factor in determining whether a violation is
likely to recur in the future and hence, whether a court should issue
prospective injunctive relief.
Courts are much more likely to approve prospective injunctive relief if
there is an official policy, regulation, or law supporting the challenged
conduct.4 23 In Kolender, a California statute required loiterers or vagabonds
to present "credible and reliable" identification when stopped by a police
officer.424 In light of this statute, the Kolender Court concluded that it was
likely that a loiterer, such as Kolender, would be stopped and asked for
identification in the future, and thus, that the lower courts were justified in
issuing injunctive relief to prevent violations of his Fourth Amendment
rights.425 Similarly, in LaDuke, the Ninth Circuit approved prospective relief
to protect immigrants from an INS policy authorizing unconstitutional
searches of immigrant dwellings.426 Likewise, in Church, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective relief
because they alleged that the City of Huntsville had a policy of harassing
and arresting homeless persons.427
In Summers, the Forestry Service had a policy of selling fire-damaged
timber lots less than 250 acres without arguably-required procedural
420. See supra Parts V.A, V.C.
421. See supra Part II.
422. See supra Part 1I.
423. See Rudovsky, supra note 86, at 1237 n.233 (stating plaintiff can demonstrate a
credible or realistic threat of harm by demonstrating that the harm was the product of a policy or
practice of government); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1821-25 (arguing post-Lyons cases are more
likely to find a credible threat of future harm if there is an official policy condoning that
misconduct); supra Part III.
424. See supra Part III.A.
425. See supra Part I.A.
426. See supra Part III.D.1.
427. See supra Part IJI.C.
42:0837]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
safeguards.428 In comparing the facts in Summers with those in Lyons,
Justice Scalia failed to recognize the importance of the official policy at
issue in Summers, making it more likely that the Service would violate the
rights of Bensman and other members of the plaintiff organizations
compared to Lyons, where official policy prohibited the conduct that Lyons
sought to enjoin.
429
C. Targeting Minorities or Particular Groups
Government misconduct is arguably more reprehensible when it targets a
group because of their racial, disability, economic, or immigrant status,
although the Lyons majority ignored the fact that Adolph Lyons was
African-American and that he alleged that racial minorities were more
likely to be killed by the chokehold.43 ° Honig, and some of the lower cases
in Part III including Thomas, LaDuke, Church, and Tandy, appeared to
consider whether the government was targeting a racial minority or a
disadvantaged group in determining the appropriateness of equitable
relief.43 1 For example, in Honig, the Court was concerned that the school
disciplinary policies inevitably targeted emotionally disturbed students like
Jack Smith, who could not avoid acting out in class.432 In Thomas, the
police allegedly targeted the plaintiffs because of their minority status.
433
Similarly, the disabled plaintiffs in Tandy alleged that the government either
targeted them or ignored their statutory rights because of their disability
status.434 The homeless plaintiffs in Church also alleged that the city
targeted them as a group because of their distressed economic condition.435
By contrast, in Summers, the government was not targeting individuals
based on immutable characteristics. Bensman voluntarily visited the
national forests and could stop doing so without physical harm and was not
as deserving of sympathy as some of the plaintiffs in Part 111.436
While courts should consider whether a government policy is targeting a
group based on immutable characteristics in deciding whether to grant
428. See supra Part V.
429. See supra Parts V.A, V.D.
430. Garrett, supra note 86, at 1826-29.
431. Id. at 1827-28; see supra Parts III.B-D, III.G.
432. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1988) (distinguishing Lyons on grounds that
plaintiffs in Honig alleged that government policies injured individuals based on immutable
characteristics); Garrett, supra note 86, at 1827 n.55.
433. See supra Part III.D.2; Garrett, supra note 86, at 1827-28 n.56.
434. See supra Part II.G.
435. See supra Part III.C.
436. See supra Part V.
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equitable relief, there are certainly cases where equitable relief is justified
even in the absence of targeting. Although some plaintiffs, who are
members of targeted groups, might have more compelling cases than
Bensman, there is no reason to deny him prospective relief for exercising
his statutory right to visit the national parks and forests.437 Additionally, if
the likelihood of future harm is the only criterion for whether a plaintiff has
standing to seek prospective relief and relief does not depend on whether
the plaintiff is entitled to compassion because he is targeted based on an
immutable characteristic, it seems as likely that Bensman will visit a
national forest as that Smith will be disruptive in class, that the homeless
will be arrested in Church, or that the disabled in Tandy will be unable to
use a Wichita Transit Bus because of a lift malfunction.43 Furthermore,
there is an equitable argument that Bensman and the plaintiff organizations
in Summers should be able to represent the right of future generations to
enjoy visiting the national forests, which is an idea that some foreign courts
have accepted, but the U.S. Supreme Court appears to recognize only when
states bring parens patriae suits on behalf of future generations. 419 Thus, the
Summers Court should have recognized that Bensman was entitled to
prospective relief because it was likely that he would be harmed in the
future by the Service's procedurally flawed timber sales.
D. Constitutional versus Statutory Rights
An interesting question is whether a plaintiff, who has a statutory right to
visit a national park, is entitled to the same relaxation of the Lyons test as a
plaintiff exercising a constitutional right like Hill, who asserted First
Amendment rights, or Kolender, who asserted Fourth Amendment rights.44 °
Bensman and the plaintiff organizations in Summers were seeking to
437. See supra Part V.
438. See supra Parts I.B-C, III.G, V.
439. See Minors Oposa v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Env't and Natural Res., 33 I.L.M. 173, 185
(S.C. 1994) (holding that a group of schoolchildren had standing to challenge the timber leasing
of old growth forests "for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations"); Mank, Future Generations, supra note :, at 8 (arguing that American private
plaintiffs should have standing in federal courts to represent future generations but
acknowledging U.S. Supreme Court only recognizes standing when states bring parens patriae
suits on behalf of future generations).
440. See supra Parts III.A, III.E. 1.
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enforce statutory rights.44" ' By partial contrast, most, but not all, of the
plaintiffs in Part III were seeking to enforce constitutional rights.442
In Lujan, Justice Scalia concluded it is irrelevant for Article III standing
whether the underlying substantive issue was a constitutional or statutory
matter, although some commentators have criticized his trans-substantive
approach to standing.443 Only in First Amendment speech cases are
plaintiffs entitled to significantly relaxed standing requirements.444 In First
Amendment cases involving government censorship of speech, the Hill
courts stated that the Supreme Court applies a relaxed standing test and
allows a person to sue on behalf of another person because of the likelihood
that some affected individuals may not file suit for fear of retaliation if they
challenge government limitations on speech.445 By contrast, the Court
rejected Adolph Lyons's prospective standing claim despite his past
constitutional injuries and his assertion that many others had suffered
similar injuries at the hands of Los Angeles police officers because he could
not prove that the police would injure his person in the future. 446 The Lyons
Court did not allow Lyons to sue on behalf of other victims of the
chokehold.447 If Los Angeles had censored speech, however, then Lyons
could have sued on behalf of others according to Hill.448
There is no reason to deny standing in Summers simply because it is not
a constitutional case. There is even an argument that courts should apply a
441. See supra Part III.
442. Most of the cases in Part III involved constitutional violations in part. See supra Parts
III.A, III.C, III.D.1-2, III.E.1-2, III.F. The Honig and Tandy cases involved statutory issues.
See supra Parts III.B, III.G.
443. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (concluding it is
irrelevant for Article III standing whether the underlying substantive issue was constitutional or
statutory); Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2251-52 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court treats
standing as a trans-substantive jurisdictional question, but criticizing that approach); supra note
23 and accompanying text.
444. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 573-74, 576; id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2240-41; supra Part I and infra Part VI.D. In addition to the special
standing rules for First Amendment litigants, the Court has allowed standing for qui tam relators
even though the relators have suffered no harm to themselves but simply receive a reward or
bounty for suing on behalf of the United States to recover for fraud against the government
because the common law traditionally provided that litigants had the authority to assign a cause
of action to another; but this is a narrow historical exception to normal standing doctrine's
personal injury requirement. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459,
495-96 (2008) (discussing Vermont Agency); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 36, at 34
(discussing qui tam actions).
445. See supra Part III.E. 1.
446. See supra Part II.B.
447. See supra Part II.B.
448. See supra Part III.E. 1.
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more lenient standing test in cases where Congress gives statutory plaintiffs
an explicit right to sue the executive branch than in purely constitutional
cases where there is no explicit right to sue. 449 Bensman and the other
plaintiffs in Summers have a statutory right to enjoy the national forests and
parks.450 They are not entitled to the lenient standing test applied to First
Amendment litigants in Hill,451 but they enjoy the same rights as most other
litigants seeking Article III standing.452 The plaintiffs in Summers
demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of future injury as required by Lyons,
Kolender, Honig, or their progeny.
Congress, in the Appeals Reform Act, provided the public with notice,
comment, and appeals rights.453 As Justice Kennedy suggested in his
concurring opinion in Summers, Congress did not include an explicit citizen
suit provision in the Act addressing plaintiffs like Bensman.45 4
Nevertheless, the Court in Summers did not question congressional intent to
allow the public to sue the Service pursuant to the Act and acknowledged
that Marderosian had standing before he settled the Burnt Ridge case.455 If it
had applied a reasonable interpretation of Lyons's realistic threat test, the
Summers Court should have found that Bensman had standing, as Justice
Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion.456
CONCLUSION
This Article faults both Justice Scalia's majority and Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinions in Summers for failing to discuss how subsequent
decisions applied or distinguished Lyons's realistic threat test.457 Likewise,
neither the Laidlaw majority nor dissent looked at Lyons's progeny. 458 By
449. Cassandra Barnum, Injury in Fact, Then and Now (And Never Again): Summers v.
Earth Island Institute and the Need for Change in Environmental Standing Law, 17 Mo. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 48 (2009).
450. See supra Part V.
451. See supra Part III.E. 1.
452. See supra Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576 (concluding it is irrelevant
for Article III standing whether the underlying substantive issue was constitutional or statutory);
Hartnett, supra note 23, at 2251-52 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court treats standing as a
trans-substantive jurisdictional question but criticizing that approach); note 23 and
accompanying text.
453. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147-48 (2009); 16 U.S.C. § 1612
(2010); see supra Part V.
454. See supra Part V.B.
455. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149-50.
456. See supra Part V.C.
457. See supra Part VI.
458. See supra Part IV.
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failing to look at a broader range of cases applying and distinguishing
Lyons, the Court in both Summers and Laidlaw missed an opportunity to
give context to the realistic threat test.459
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Summers seriously misapplied the
realistic threat test in Lyons to the facts of Summers.46 Adolph Lyons was
the one time victim of abuse, and the Los Angeles Police Department,
subsequently during the litigation, adopted an official policy prohibiting the
police from using a chokehold without provocation. 461 By contrast,
Bensman had visited numerous national parks and forests in the past, and
there is every reason to believe that he will do so in the future.462 The
Service has a clear policy of selling fire-damaged-timber in lots of less than
250 acres without procedural safeguards.463 It is true, as Justice Scalia
argued, that it is uncertain whether Bensman's travels will take him to a
forest where the Service is selling timber without the procedural safeguards
that the plaintiffs contend are required by statute or regulation.464 But the
proper way to assess the probability he will do so is to ask in how many
forests are such sales taking place, as Justice Breyer suggested in his
Summers dissent.465 Even Justice Scalia conceded it was "likely" that a
member of the plaintiff organizations would hike in an affected forest. 466 As
Justice Breyer argued in dissent, Justice Scalia's opinion demanded more
certainty than is required by the term "realistic threat.,
467
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Summers was more persuasive
than the majority opinion because he discussed the probability that
Bensman would hike in an affected forest, thereby applying Lyons's
realistic threat test to the facts of Summers.468 Additionally, he provided
some examples from other areas of the law to illustrate what is a realistic
threat of future harm. 469 Nevertheless, his opinion would have been stronger
if he had discussed at least some of the cases examined in Part III. Perhaps
he shied away from these cases because they involved constitutional claims
or disability statutes, but these cases provide necessary context to
understanding Lyons's realistic threat test.
459. See supra Part VI.
460. See supra Part VI.
461. See supra Part II.
462. See supra Parts V.C, VI.B.
463. See supra Parts V.C, VI.B.
464. See supra Part V.A.
465. See supra Part V.C.
466. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1152 (2009).
467. See supra Part V.C.
468. See supra Part V.C.
469. See supra Part V.C.
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The cases in Part III are diverse. But they suggest that courts are willing
to distinguish Lyons and grant injunctive relief against the government in
factual circumstances different from Lyons. For example, courts are more
likely to distinguish Lyons, which involved a single incident of government
misconduct, and recognize standing for prospective relief if a plaintiff has
been harmed by the government on multiple occasions in the past because
courts assume that government officials who have repeatedly violated the
law in the past are more likely to repeat that misconduct in the future, unless
there has been a change in policy suggesting a change in behavior.47
Additionally, courts are more willing to assume that plaintiffs who engage
in legally protected conduct will continue to engage in that conduct in the
future, despite misconduct by the government, and less likely to assume that
a plaintiff such as Adolph Lyons, who engages in illegal conduct, will
repeat that conduct in the future. 471
In comparing Summers to the cases in Part III, it is important to observe
that the Service was expected to engage in many procedurally questionable
salvage sales in the future according to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
in Summers,472 and therefore, the probability of future harm by the
government in Summers was more like Kolender or Honig, cases where the
Supreme Court approved injunctive relief against the government, than
Lyons, where the Court rejected injunctive relief.473 Also, because Bensman
and the other members of the plaintiff organizations were engaged in
legally-protected conduct in visiting our national parks, they were,
therefore, much more likely to engage in that legal conduct in the future
than Adolph Lyons was to engage in future illegal conduct.47 4 Furthermore,
courts are much more willing to recognize standing for prospective relief if
a plaintiff can show that the government has an official policy of
committing the alleged wrongful behavior, unlike Lyons where the officers'
conduct would have violated Department policy if they repeated that
conduct in the future.475 Based on Bensman's multiple visits to national
parks and forests and the Service's policy of conducting timber sales
without required procedures on sales involving less than 250 acres, the
Summers Court should have held that Bensman faced a realistic threat of
future harm, and thus, had standing to seek prospective relief. 476
470. See supra Part VI.A.
471. See supra Part VI.A.
472. See supra Part V.C.
473. See supra Part VI.A.
474. See supra Part VI.A.
475. See supra Part VI.B.
476. See supra Parts VI.A-B.
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